Essays on Monetary Integration, Inflation, and Trade Competitiveness in Transition Countries by Uzagalieva, Ainura
CERGE-EI 
The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University 











Essays on monetary integration, inflation, 



































Essays on monetary integration, inflation, 





















I would like to thank Prof. Jacek Cukrowski (the supervisor of this work) from  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for his valuable advice, sound 
support, and for inspiring me with confidence to succeed on this research. I highly 
appreciate all comments and suggestions which Prof. Lubomir Lizal (the local 
chair), Professors Randall Filer, Sergey Slobodyan, Kresimir Zigic from CERGE-
EI gave me for the improvement of individual papers. I am also grateful to Ms. 
Robin-Eliece Mercury, Ms. Sarah Peck, and Ms. Laura Strakova from the English 
Department of CERGE-EI for their help with English editing.  
 
I gratefully acknowledge the financial and professional support of the Economic 
Education and Research Consortium (EERC). I am especially grateful to Prof. 
Michael Beenstock and Prof. Wojciech W. Charemza for helpful comments, 
advice and discussions given in the framework of the project “Finding Optimal 





Jacek Cukrowski, Ph.D (Chair) 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Advisor 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS 
Grosslingova 35, 811 09, Bratislava, Slovakia 
 
Lubomir Lizal, Ph.D (Local Chair) 
Assistant Professor of Economics, Researcher  
The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and the 
Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CERGE-EI) 
P.O. Box 882, Politických Vězňů 7, 111 21 Praha 1, Czech Republic 
 
Randall Filer, Ph.D (Member) 
Visiting Professor of Economics   
The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and the 
Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CERGE-EI) 
P.O. Box 882, Politických Vězňů 7, 111 21 Praha 1, Czech Republic 
 
Sergej Slobodyan, Ph.D (Member) 
Assistant Professor of Economics, Researcher 
The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and the 
Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CERGE-EI) 
P.O. Box 882, Politických Vězňů 7, 111 21 Praha 1, Czech Republic 
 
Kresimir Zigich, Ph.D (Member) 
Associate Professor of Economics, Researcher  
The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and the 
Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CERGE-EI) 






Dr. Manfred M. Fischer, Ph.D  
Dean of Social Sciences 
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration 
Augasse 2-6, A 1090-Vienna, Austria, E.U. 
 
Attila Ratfai, Ph.D 
Department of Economics 
Central European University 





   
    
 5
Table of Contents 
 
Preface 
             
I. Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within the Common Economic Area: 
the Case of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
1. Introduction 
2. A total gross seigniorage concept: components and measures 










II. Labor Market Flexibility, International Competitiveness and Patterns of Trade 
1. Introduction 
2. The concept of labor market flexibility 
3. The speed of labor market adjustment and a firm’s input-output decisions 
4. Price uncertainty and an autarky regime in a Ricardian setting 
5. The impact of labor market flexibility on international trade patterns 





III. Optimal Measures of Core Inflation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
1. Introduction 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1. Exclusion method 
2.2. Trimmed means method  
2.3. Standard deviation trimmed means method 
2.4. Percentiles method 
2.5. Optimality criteria 
3. The CPI as a measure of inflation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
4. Model specification and estimation results 
4.1. Exclusion method 
4.2. Trimmed means method 
4.3. Standard deviation trimmed means method 
4.4. Percentile method  

















































This dissertation contains three essays focused on macroeconomic issues in the 
Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). Two essays, which analyse recent monetary and 
inflation issues in the CIS, contribute to empirical studies in the area of monetary economics 
of countries under transition. The third essay explores, formally and empirically, a link 
between labor market regulations and international trade and proposes a possible area of 
trade specialization for a number of countries as, for example, landlocked economies in 
Central Asia (CA). The important theoretical point to be gained from this essay is that there 
are very clear reasons for international trade between similar or identical countries, even 
between markets that are competitive. Namely, the rational for international trade can be 
based on, apart from the standard concept of differences in productivities, differences in 
labor market regulations among countries.       
In recent years tendencies to coordinate economic policies among CIS countries 
have strengthened. One of the examples is a project for the creation of a Common 
Monetary Area (CMA) among Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Integration within this 
context will inevitably deprive the policymakers of monetary policy instruments and 
seigniorage revenues obtained by the governments from their central banks. Moreover, 
due to the diversity of law enforcement in collecting taxes and the general 
macroeconomic environment, which result in different size of seigniorage revenues 
obtained in the pre-integration period, there will be a fiscal effect across the countries 
with different patterns and size. In this context it is very important to understand the 
pattern of these changes as these changes will play a crucial role in negotiations among 
the member states for the rules regulating the distribution of seigniorage wealth brought 
about by the common monetary area. Thus, the main focus of this essay is on the role, 
real scale, and sources of central bank earnings and transfers to the budget and the 
welfare effect of monetary integration. Moreover, in the pre-integration period, it is 
particularly vital to investigate how policymakers could increase budgetary revenues 
from central bank seigniorage and credibly commit to low inflation. These problems are 
addressed in the first essay. 
The next issue, interesting both from a research viewpoint and policy implications 
for CIS countries, is the link between labor market regulations and the competitive 
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position of countries in international trade. Today the largest net exporters in the CIS are 
Kazakhstan and Russia, other countries with permanent trade proficits are Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine and the rest have permanent trade deficits.1  In other words, 
even if CIS countries are engaged in international exchange of goods, their exports 
include, mainly, minerals and energy resources (e.g. Turkmenistan).  So, an important 
question is what the possible area of specialization in international trade, especially for 
low-income CA economies, would be. Based on formal and empirical analysis presented 
in the second essay, we argue that proper regulations towards higher flexibility of labor 
markets and market competition can create additional comparative advantages, in 
particular in producing goods with unstable demand (e.g., fashionable fabrics, clothes, 
and toys), and improve competitive position in international markets. This is because 
differences in labor market flexibility between countries affect their competitive positions 
in international markets and can serve as an independent cause of international trade.  
In light of the CMA creation, preferences in macroeconomic management are 
given to gradual economic convergence. Other CIS countries can join the area if they 
accept the agreement requirements and meet the macroeconomic criteria set within the 
CMA. In these circumstances it becomes very important for policymakers to prudently 
commit to the policy of macroeconomic stability including a credible policy of low 
inflation. In this respect, the majority of CIS countries announced their intentions to 
switch monetary policies from instrumental methods based on the consumer price index 
(CPI) towards inflation targeting based on core inflation. However, core inflation, which 
is defined as the sustained change of prices that reflects long-term price movements, has 
not yet been thoroughly studied in these economies. In this respect, the second essay, 
which analyzes the alternative methods of measuring core inflation in the Kyrgyz 
Republic (KR), where the dynamic of CPI is characterized by high volatility and irregular 
fluctuations due to a strong impact of exogenous factors2, contributes to the current 
research in this area. 
                                                          
1 Source: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (IBRD/WB), 2005:  
World Development Indicators (WDI). 
2Important sources of exogenous shocks are exchange rate fluctuations, high dependence on energy 
products, changes in the state-controlled prices and tariffs. 
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The first essay was published in Post-Communist Economies [Uzagalieva A., 
(2005) Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within a Common Economic Area: 
the Case of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, Vol. 17,  No.4, pp. 399-424]. The preliminary 
version of this paper appeared in the CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, No. 254 (April 
2005) under the same title. The second essay, which is “Labor Market Flexibility, 
International Competitiveness and Patterns of Trade,” is forthcoming in Economia 
Internazionale/International Economics. The preliminary version of this paper is 
forthcoming in the CERGE-EI Working Paper Series under the same title. The third essay, 
which is “Finding Optimal Measures of Core Inflation in the Kyrgyz Republic”, was 
published in Problems of Economic Transition [Uzagalieva A., (2006) Optimal Measures 
of Core Inflation in Kyrgyzstan, Vol.49, No.3, pp. 6-53]. The preliminary version of this 
paper was published in the Economic Education and Research Consortium (EERC)-Russia 
Working Paper Series, No. 67 in 2004 both in Russian and English languages and the 
updated version was published in the CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, No. 261 (May 
2005).  
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The aim of this paper is to analyze the possible impact of planned monetary integration 
on public sector revenues from seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Using the 
concept of total gross seigniorage, we investigate the main sources and uses of the 
central bank revenues in these countries. Special attention is given to the role of 
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1. Introduction 
Given the limited success of market reforms in individual economies, tendencies 
to coordinate economic policies among Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) 
countries have strengthened in recent years. The most prominent example of such a trend 
is a project for the creation of a common monetary area (CMA) including Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia. Belarus and Russia have already taken the first step in this 
process. Both countries signed an agreement on the Common Emission Center (CEC) of 
the Russia-Belarus Union on November 30, 2000, stating that a new currency, the ruble 
of the Union State, will be introduced as legal tender in Russia and Belarus starting from 
January 1, 2008. During an intermediate period, from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 
2007, the Russian ruble will circulate as a single currency in both countries. Signing the 
Government Decree on the Concept of Financial System Development by the 
government of Kazakhstan on July 28, 2003, was another important step towards 
monetary integration. According to this Concept, Kazakhstan intends to start preparing to 
join the CMA in 2005. It is assumed that monetary integration will take place in 2011. 
Expected monetary integration among three CIS countries raises important issues 
related to fiscal and monetary policies since the influence of factors, which underlie the 
inefficiency of the tax system and revenue motives for monetary expansion, is strong. A 
large shadow economy,3 which is not possible to tax, and underdeveloped capital 
markets, at which governments cannot sell large amounts of treasury bills, strengthen the 
public-finance motives of seigniorage obtained by a central bank (Koreshkova 2003). The 
creation of the CMA will deprive the national policymakers of monetary policy 
instruments and change the redistribution of seigniorage revenues. Consequently, it will 
have budgetary consequences with different patterns and magnitudes across the countries 
since the size of the seigniorage, which is transferred by the central banks to their 
governments, is not the same. In this respect, it is important to investigate the magnitude 
of seigniorage transfers to the state budget in a pre-integration period, analyze the 
country-specific features of institutional and monetary environment, and estimate the 
welfare impact of monetary integration. These issues are critical because they would play 
                                                          
3The average size of the black market during 2000-2001 is about 47% of GDP in Belarus, 42% of GDP in 
Kazakhstan, and 45% in Russia (Schneider 2002). 
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a crucial role in negotiations among the member states for the rules regulating the 
distribution of seigniorage wealth within the CMA. 
The importance of seigniorage revenues in the context of monetary integration 
was already recognized in a number of studies related to the creation of a common 
currency area in the European Union (EU) (see Cukrowski and Fischer 2002; Feist 2001; 
Schobert 2001; Sinn and Feist 1997, 2000). In particular, due to cross-country differences 
in banking regulations and the level of accumulated seigniorage wealth, monetary 
integration will result in large welfare transfers among the member states of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) (Sinn and Feist 1997, 2000). The authors found that among 
fifteen EU member states, countries with a more liberal banking sector like France and 
the UK (e.g., with low reserve-deposit ratio) would gain. However, countries like 
Germany, Austria, and Spain would lose as they are characterized by less liberalization of 
banking sectors with high reserve requirements. Further studies (Cukrowski and Fischer 
2002) that focused on the new EU member states suggest that if the current mechanism of 
seigniorage wealth distribution does not change, virtually all countries, except the Czech 
Republic, will gain by joining the euro zone. This can be explained by a seigniorage 
distribution mechanism (see Section 4), in particular, by the fact that the new EU member 
states are relatively poor compared to the countries of the euro area, and therefore, their 
population shares will be larger than their respective GDP shares in the EMU. Larger 
capital shares in the European Central Bank (ECB) relative to the share of a country’s 
seigniorage wealth in a common pool will allow them to receive a larger portion of it.  
The general economic environment as well as the institutional features of central 
banks in CIS countries are different from that in EMU accessing countries. So, the main 
components of the central bank revenues and the welfare impact of monetary integration 
in the conditions of CIS countries deserve special attention. The aim of this study is to 
analyze sources and uses of the central bank’s seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Russia, taking into account specific features of the monetary environment as well as 
central bank institutional arrangements and the potential welfare effect caused by 
monetary integration in each country. The analysis is based on official documents (e.g., 
financial sector legislation and the annual reports of the central banks) characterizing 
central bank operations during 1997-2003. Potential welfare gains or losses from 
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monetary integration are estimated assuming three possible mechanisms of seigniorage 
wealth redistribution among the member states of CMA: (1) redistribution proportional to 
accumulated seigniorage wealth; (2) redistribution according to the mechanism used in 
the EMU; and (3) redistribution according to economic potential of the member states. 
    
2. A total gross seigniorage concept: components and measures  
Theoretical and empirical studies (Fischer 1982; Friedman 1971) consider 
seigniorage revenues as the main economic argument in favor of national currencies that 
determines the desire of a country in choosing a domestic currency over a foreign one. 
This argument is also important for countries considering either to integrate in monetary 
unions or to adopt official dollarization (or eurization, rublification) by substituting their 
national currencies. The following basic concepts of seigniorage are distinguished in the 
literature.  A conventional monetary concept is based on the idea that a government can 
finance its spending through direct loans from a central bank, creating high-powered 
money in the form of non-interest bearing currency (Fischer 1982; Friedman 1971; 
Haslag 1998; Schobert 2001). An opportunity cost concept is associated with an optimal 
tax approach which implies that the higher the costs of collecting taxes the higher the 
seigniorage is (Honohan 1996; Klein and Nuemann 1990; Schobert 2001). Under this 
concept, the government finances its spending through issuing and selling interest bearing 
bonds rather than through issuing non-interest bearing currency. A fiscal dominance 
concept is the situation when government sets fiscal plans, determines the level of 
seigniorage for financing the budget revenues irrespective of monetary policy objective, 
and thus strongly influences decision-making in the central bank (Honohan 1996; Sargent 
and Wallace 1981). And a fiscal concept joins all the mentioned approaches into a single 
approach as a general measure of seigniorage revenue (Drazen 1985, 1989; Honohan 
1996; Klein and Neumann 1990; Neumann 1996; Schobert 2001). 
Drazen (1985) suggests that each of the above-mentioned measures is a special 
case which relates to specific monetary and fiscal policy experiments and conditions. He 
distinguishes between the financing and taxation aspects of monetary expansion and 
focuses on the net revenues that fiscal authorities receive from monetary operations. 
These operations are related not only to the creation of a monetary base but also to the 
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management of the central bank. It also takes into account previous monetary expansions, 
which continue to accrue government assets that provide present yields. This difference 
was especially stressed by Cukrowski and Fischer (2002); Cukrowski and Janecki (1998); 
Cukrowski and Stavrev (2001); Klein and Neumann (1990) and Neumann (1996) and 
developed further as a total gross seigniorage concept. In particular, Neumann (1996) 
showed formally that this concept generalizes the above-mentioned concepts and allows 
one to analyze seigniorage in the broadest possible sense as the sum of all revenues 
resulting from the monopoly power of the central bank to manage its base money.  
The variety of seigniorage concepts determine different ways of measuring 
seigniorage revenues. Also, the process of generating and using seigniorage revenues in a 
particular country depends on country-specific features, in particular, on the legal, 
institutional, and operational arrangement of the central bank (Drazen 1985). The actual 
independence of the central bank is especially important in this aspect since an 
independent central bank can prevent government from financing inflationary budget 
expenditures. Empirical evidence shows that in CIS economies, central banks are 
characterized by a limited degree of independence (Maliszewski 2000), although legally 
almost all of them are considered independent. For instance, the central banks of Belarus, 
Russia, and Ukraine have the least political independence among 20 transition 
economies4 with the political indexes estimated at 5, 5, and 3, respectively.5  Limitations 
on the amount of credit from the central bank to its government to correspond with key 
factors determining economic independence are almost non-existent in Belarus and the 
Ukraine. Although legislation in Russia and Kazakhstan prohibits the central banks to 
finance their governments, in some cases this requirement is overlooked.  
Obviously, given the different degree of central bank independence across 
countries and consequently, the variety of monetary environments, the practice of 
obtaining seigniorage revenues varies as well. In this respect, the total gross seigniorage 
                                                          
4The sample covers former Soviet countries: Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine and Central European countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
5The indexes of political and economic independence ranges from 2 to 9 in this study. The index of 
political independence is determined by the relationship of the central bank with its government, the 
procedure of appointing the board of the central bank, and a formal goal of the central bank. In countries 
with sound political independence of the central bank, this index is high (e.g., 8 in Kyrgyzstan, 8 in the 
Czech Republic, and 7 in Poland).  
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concept, which analyzes seigniorage in the broadest possible sense as the sum of all 
revenue flows from the central bank to the government, takes into account not only 
operations related to monetary base but also other activities including the management of 
the central bank and its relations with the government. Therefore, this concept implies a 
more detailed analysis of the mechanism underlying the creation and allocation of 
seigniorage revenues than usual, taking into account the country-specific features of 
monetary environment and the institutional arrangements of the central bank. In 
comparison to other concepts, this is the only one that allows the proper inter-country 
comparison of seigniorage revenues created by the central bank.  
Nuemann (1996) specifies the total gross seigniorage (s) as  
 
(1)     s = sM + sI + sOP + sRI.  
 
The first term of this expression, sM, denotes monetary seigniorage, which is a change in 
the real, i.e. deflated by the general price level, stock of monetary base (∆M)6. Monetary 
seigniorage is defined as   







where p denotes the general price level and m – real balances. The second term, sI, 
denotes net interest revenues accrued on the stock of non-government debt deflated by 
the general price level, and it is expressed as  
(3)        , 
 
where AP denotes the net claims of the central bank to the domestic private sector and AF 
– the net foreign assets of the central bank; the terms, iP and iF, correspond to nominal 
interest rates, respectively. The third term (sOP) describes net revenues from the central 
bank’s operations deflated by the general price level  
(4)                 , 
                                                          









where G stands for net revenue. Finally, sRI  denotes book gains due to a change in the 
value of net foreign assets resulting from exchange rate movements. This term is defined 
as  








where L denotes a book gain, and e – exchange rate.  
As it was noted by Cukrowski and Janecki (1998); Cukrowski and Stavrev 
(2001); and Cukrowski and Fischer (2002), empirical studies based on the monetary 
seigniorage concept usually only approximate actual seigniorage flow from the central 
bank to the government. This stems from two simplified assumptions: one is that the 
government receives seigniorage revenues irrespective of the legal and institutional 
regulations existing between the government and the central bank; and another is that the 
amount of seigniorage revenues transferred to the government is independent of the 
specificity of the monetary environment. The authors argue that such a simplification 
does not take into account the cost of money production, which can be very large,7 nor 
the existence of the central bank as a whole. Neumann (1996) shows that the central bank 
uses seigniorage for covering its expenses on money creation and operating activities 
(sC); investments in non-government debt (sNI); transfers to the state budget (sG); and 
financing its own capital and reserves or payments to third parties (sO):  
 
(6)                  . 
 
In the expression (6), the costs on money creation and operating activities are defined as 
the sum of the cost of printing notes (CBn) and the cost of maintaining operations (CCB) 
deflated by the general price level:  
 
(7)        . 
                                                          





7As Klein and Neumann (1990) showed from 1974 to 1987, about 16.9% of German monetary seigniorage 
was used to cover the Bundesbank´s operating costs.  
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The central bank holding of non-government debts is defined as the change of the net 
claim to the domestic private sector (∆AP) and the net foreign assets (∆AF) as 






The expressions for determining budget financing (sG) and an increase in central bank 
capital and reserves are: 
(9)          , and 
 
(10)                      respectively.  
 
In the expression (10), RO denotes profit transferred to third parties or used for reserves 
and capital accumulation. 
Following Neumann (1996), the part of the seigniorage transferred to the state 
budget sG (specified by expression [9]) is called fiscal seigniorage. The government 
receives fiscal seigniorage through net borrowing from the central bank (∆AG) and taking 
the profits of the central bank net of interest payments earned on the stock of government 
debt (RG - iG AG). Consequently, fiscal seigniorage can be fully determined by expression 
(9), taking into consideration the country-specific features as well as the details of the 
legal, institutional, and operational arrangements of the central bank.  
 
3. Sources and uses of seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (empirical 
results) 
The concept presented in the preceding section views seigniorage from two 
important angles: creation and distribution. This section deals with the empirical 
estimation of the sources and uses of seigniorage in three countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Russia in a period 1997 to 2003. Specific features of the monetary environment and 
the institutional arrangements of the central banks in each country are described. The 
sources of the data are International Finance Statistics (IFS) and the annual reports of 
central banks for the period 1997 to 2003, which contain the balance sheet records of 
central bank assets and liabilities and financial statements of income and expenditures of 











are calculated at annual frequency in terms of national currencies and expressed as a 
fraction of GDP for the purpose of comparison across the countries.  
The results of estimations indicate that the size of central bank seigniorage 
revenues (total seigniorage) is quite high in all countries under consideration (Table 2 in 
Appendix). The average value of seigniorage obtained by the central banks of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia during 1997 to 2003 are 4.3% of GDP, 5.1% of GDP, and 5.7% 
of GDP, correspondingly. These values are larger than the average size of seigniorage 
estimated during 1971-1990 in 78 countries8 (Click 1998), which rank from less than 
0.5% GDP to about 4.0% of GDP.  
The year by year change of seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia shows 
that in all three countries it increased drastically in 1998 and 1999, approaching the upper 
boundary (10.1% of GDP) in the ranking of 42 developing countries by the average of 
seigniorage during 1974-1985 (De Haan, Zelhost, and Roukens 1993). So, the total 
seigniorage reached 8.5% of GDP in 1998 in Belarus; in Kazakhstan – 6.7% of GDP in 
1999; and in Russia – 9.8% of GDP in 1998. This was the result of a financial crisis in 
Russia in 1998, where the annual inflation rate reached 84.4%, currency depreciated by 4 
times, foreign reserves declined by 31.3%, output fell by 4.6%, and the budget deficit 
was to 8.2% of GDP. The Russian crisis heavily influenced the economies of Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, causing during the year, a very large decline in foreign trade (by 19.6% and 
7.0%, respectively); an exchange rate depreciation (by 5.6 and 1.5 times, respectively); 
and an increase in the annual inflation rates (to 351.2% and 17.8%, correspondingly).  
The comparison of total seigniorage revenues suggests that during 1997-1999, the 
manner of collecting seigniorage revenues by the central banks was similar across the 
countries under consideration. Namely, in this period monetary seigniorage is a main part 
of seigniorage revenues. For example, at the end of 1999 the monetary seigniorage 
component reached 74.1% of the total seigniorage revenues in Belarus; 34.0% in 
Kazakhstan9; and 85.8% in Russia. From 1998 to 1999 the book gain component, which 
                                                          
8 Click (1998) investigated seigniorage in a cross-section of 90 countries over the period 1971-1990. 
Countries with the largest size of seigniorage are Israel with 14.8 % of GDP, Yugoslavia with 11.9% of 
GDP, Chile with 10.3% of GDP, Argentina with 9.7% of GDP, and Nicaragua with 7.9% of GDP. 
9 A relatively small size of monetary seigniorage in the total seigniorage revenue of Kazakhstan in 1999 
was due to a large increase in the book gain component of seigniorage (it reached 52.8% of total 
seigniorage). This result was due to strong exchange rate depreciation. 
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is just an increase in the recorded value of foreign reserves in terms of national 
currencies, resulting from an exchange rate depreciation was also very large reaching 
26.3% of total seigniorage in Belarus; 52.8% in Kazakhstan; and 41.7% in Russia.  
In all subsequent years (i.e., from 2000 to 2003), however, the ways of obtaining 
total seigniorage differs across the countries. The government sectors of Kazakhstan and 
Russia, for instance, increased the amounts of their oil-related funds held in their central 
banks which, correspondingly, contributed to the decrease in government debt. The 
government funds contributed to the total seigniorage revenues with about 3.8% of GDP 
in Kazakhstan and 1.2% of GDP in Russia on average during 2000 to 2003. The total 
seigniorage of Belarus declined during these years from 5.3% of GDP in 1999 to 2.2% of 
GDP in 2003 (Table 2 in Appendix) due to a strict monetary policy (monetary 
seigniorage declined from 3.9 % of GDP in 1999 to 1.6% of GDP in 2003). 
The structure of seigniorage by distribution, on the contrary, is characterized by a 
more diverging pattern across countries. While the central bank of Belarus was using 
seigniorage revenues mainly for financing the state and public sectors throughout the 
whole period considered, the central banks of Russia and Kazakhstan were using it, 
especially after the crisis of 1998, for their investing activities and financial reserves and 
capital. In order to examine to what extent the central banks were financing their 
governments, a more detailed overview of seigniorage uses with a brief description of the 
general economic, monetary and legal environment in each country are presented below.  
 
3.1. Belarus 
The banking system of Belarus consists of the central bank, named the National 
Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB), and commercial banks, about 80% of which 
are owned by the state.10 Legally the institutional status of the NBRB is recognized to be 
independent from the government and state agencies. However, in practice such 
independence is very limited both politically and economically. In particular, the 
chairman of the NBRB, who is appointed by the president, must necessarily be a member 
of the government. Moreover, in its lending activity the NBRB acts not only as the lender 
                                                          
10 See EBRD Transition Report 2004. 
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of last resort for banks, but also as a creditor to the government,11 providing it with direct 
loans in compliance with the budget law.  
Data presented in Table 2 (in Appendix) demonstrates that the central bank in 
Belarus used a relatively large portion of its seigniorage revenues for financing the 
government budget in the years of 1997 to 1999. The size of fiscal seigniorage is 
especially large in 1998 when the NBRB transferred to the government the amount 
equivalent to 5.3% of GDP. During 1999-2003, the amount of the NBRB’s fiscal 
transfers to the government gradually decreased. It  fell  from  3.5%  of  GDP  in  1999  
to 1.3% of  GDP  in  2001,  and in 2002, it switched from a positive to a negative number 
(-1.1% of GDP) due to the large reduction (by 64.2%) of government obligations towards 
NBRB during the year. The reason for this was that the government of Belarus privatized 
a gas transporting and distributing company (Beltransgaz) in 2002 under the condition of 
an agreement with Russia giving to Belarus an access to natural gas from Russian 
Gazprom at internal prices in Russia. So, an increase in privatization revenues from 1.2% 
of GDP to 2.8% of GDP during the year allowed the government to finance about 72.0% 
of its fiscal deficit without relying on the revenues of the central bank. In addition, 
reforms in the energy sector, namely, an increase in the tariffs of gas and energy for 
households (by 2.9 times), which were assigned to raise the cost recovery of enterprises, 
contributed to the increase of tax collections (by 0.3% of GDP) in 2002. As a result, the 
net claim of the central bank to the government was reduced during the year.  
Difficulties with the balance of payments (Table 3 in Appendix) did not allow the 
government to rely much on the external sources of budget financing in 2003. So, the net 
foreign financing of the budget deficit decreased from 15.1 mln. USD in 2002 to -8.8 
mln. USD in 2003. Besides, the slow speed of structural reforms and privatization did not 
allow any improvement the in collection of tax revenues and privatization receipts, which 
increased by 0.1% GDP only during the year. So, persisting difficulties in the area of 
government finance caused the NBRB to increase the amount of fiscal transfers in 2003 
again. It reached 1.0% of GDP indicating the fact that the NBRB is required to provide 
the government with funds for financing the budget deficit (1.2% of GDP)12 through 
                                                          
11 See “Banking Code of the Republic of Belarus” passed by the House of Representatives on October 3, 
2000 and approved by the Council of the Republic on October 12, 2000. 
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either extending direct credits or purchasing government bonds at the primary market or 
both. The scale of the fiscal seigniorage transferred by the NBRB to the government 






























M onetary s eigniorage Fis cal s eigniorage
Figure 1 reveals that the NBRB used for financing its budget deficit revenues generated 
through money creation. Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, the NBRB used the largest part 
of its seigniorage revenues, especially from 1997 to 1998 (about 3.1% of GDP), for 
extending credits to private or the non-governmental sector of the economy. In almost all 
years except 1999, a primary component of seigniorage use is net investment or an 
increase in the holdings of the central bank of private (i.e., non-government) domestic 
and foreign debt. 
It needs to be stressed that one has to be very careful when using the word 
“private” as a descriptor for the net investments of the central bank in non-government 
debt instruments because the private sector in Belarus includes not only privately owned 
enterprises, but also state-owned enterprises as well as the household sector. Here we 
have to mention that according to official documents,13 the NBRB was expected to 
provide directed credits to the private sector upon the requests of state organizations 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 See Law of the Republic of Belarus “On the Budget of the Republic of Belarus” for the period 1998 to 
2003. 
13 See Annual reports of the NBRB for the period 1998 to 2003. 
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during the whole period considered. The directed credits were assigned for such purposes 
as housing, development of the agricultural sector, support of agricultural production, 
seeds purchasing, salary payments for the workers of state enterprises, state emergency, 
and trade. Therefore, the definition of private sector in Belarus might be vague and thus, 
should be extended to a broadly defined public sector.  
Since the central bank with limited autonomy has been required to extend credits 
directly to enterprises or commercial banks upon a direct order from the government, the 
real scale of public sector transfers is very large.14 However, the exact size of the public 
enterprise sector deficit cannot be measured precisely due to data limitations15 and 
estimating the size of quasi-fiscal operations of the central bank is beyond the scope of 
this study. The fiscal seigniorage and net investment of NBRB in non-governmental debt, 
























Figure 2. Belarus: monetary seigniorage versus fiscal seigniorage and net investment  
 
Obviously, revenues from money creation were not enough, especially in 1998, to cover 
fiscal and quasi-fiscal (investment) expenditures of the NBRB, so it used its revenues 
                                                          
14The quasi-fiscal deficit, which reflects large directed credits to the public sector and state enterprises, 
reached 11.1% of GDP in 1999 (Markiewicz 2000).  
15According to the International Monetary Fund, the size of quasi-fiscal operations has been high in recent 
years too, however information on the deficit of public enterprises is under the direct control of the 
presidential administration and publicly not available (see IMF Country Report No.04/141, May 2004). 
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earned on financial operations for covering the remaining part of such expenditures. 
Table 2 suggests that the revenues obtained from financial operations are about 0.6% of 
GDP from 1997 to 2003 on average in Belarus, so the central bank of Belarus must be 
using other sources of financing. According to the results presented in the Table 2 (in 
Appendix), when the difference between the monetary seigniorage and fiscal and quasi-
fiscal investments of the central bank is very large, the amount of funds used for the 
accumulation of capital reserves and third party transfers (the sO item) is negative. These 
suggest that the NBRB either decreased the size of its capital and reserves or used 
transfers from third parties for financing the fiscal seigniorage and its investments, or 
both. Presumably, it was converting the private or, more precisely, the non-governmental 
sector debt to the government sector.   
 
3.2. Kazakhstan  
Legislation stipulates the main principles of central bank independence in 
Kazakhstan, however there exists a channel that limits its actual independence in practice. 
In particular, legislation emphasizes that the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) should 
operate independently, should act as a bank, financial adviser, and agent of the 
government bodies, and the state and government agencies have no right to interfere in its 
operations.16 Furthermore, the NBK should not provide the government with direct 
financing.17 However, the structure of the NBK’s management, which consists of two 
boards – a supervisory board, the highest administrative body, and the board of directors 
– attracts special attention. In particular, the supervisory body, which is responsible for 
authorizing legal acts drafted by the NBK on major policy directions as well as on the 
main operational activities, consists of nine members including representatives delegated 
by the president and the government. As a result, state bodies can directly influence the 
decision-making process of the NBK on both major policy and operational issues. 
Therefore, in comparison to the central bank of Belarus, the central bank of Kazakhstan 
has a higher degree of autonomy, but its decision-making process can be influenced by 
the government.   
                                                          
16 See the law “On the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan” No. 2155, March 30, 1995. 
17 The practice of extending direct credits to the government for financing the budget deficit was banned in 
1998. 
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The allocation of seigniorage revenues indicates that the size of fiscal seigniorage 
obtained by the government of Kazakhstan directly from the central bank is small. As 
Table 2 (in Appendix) shows, the highest level of fiscal seigniorage (0.3% of GDP) was 
collected in 1998 and the lowest (-6.6% of GDP) in 2001. We should note that in all 

























Figure 3. Kazakhstan: monetary seigniorage versus net investment and fiscal seigniorage 
 
In other words, the NBK acted as a debtor rather than a creditor of the government. In 
this respect, the structure of the net investment component of the NBK deserves special 
attention. 
Generally, the activity of the NBK during the period considered in this study was 
highly responsive to the government policies since the supervisory board, which 
authorizes the major policy guidelines and operational activities of the NBK, includes the 
government as well as presidential representatives. In particular, the government 
priorities to strengthen investment activities in the economy and to support the business 
sector are reflected in the reporting system of the NBK.18 As Table 2 (in Appendix) 
illustrates, the net investments of the NBK are the largest portion of seigniorage usage 
during 1997 to 2003, reaching almost 3.9% of GDP, on average. The peak level of this 
component is indicated in 2001 (9.1% of GDP) due to a large increase (by 1.8 times) in 
                                                          
18 See, for example, the Annual Report of the NBK for 2000, 2001, and 2002. 
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the foreign reserves of the NBK. Since about a half of this inflow is from government 
funds, namely, oil-related funds and others state revenues (e.g., privatization receipts, 
rent payments for cosmodrome “Bajkonur”), fiscal seigniorage was the lowest (-6.6% of 
GDP).  In addition, the NBK extended large credits19 to the banking sector and various 
institutions both in domestic as well as foreign currencies to deal with one of the state 
priorities, to support the business sector of the country. It should be noted that major 
receivers of these directed credits were gold-mining companies and small- and medium- 
sized enterprises. So, the large net investments of the NBK have resulted from the 
inflows of government foreign reserves and credits extended to the real sector directly 
through the banking system. 
Apart from foreign reserves held by the government, the NBK was also using 
government securities for its investment activities. Namely, it was acquiring the 
ownership of bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(MFRK) upon their placement in the primary market. In addition, it was issuing short-
term notes, which are called “government securities issued by the NBK,”20 both in 
domestic and foreign currencies with its privilege to specify all procedures and conditions 
on their selling and buying. Consequently, the NBK was transforming the government 
debt instrument into its own debt either through buying government securities with an 
ownership or issuing new securities on its own behalf and placing them in the primary 
market. This is another reason for a year by year reduction in the net claims of the NBK 
on the government and a negative sign of fiscal seigniorage.  
 
3.3. Russia  
The banking system of Russia includes the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), 
founded on July 13, 1990 and commercial banks. Unlike Belarus and Kazakhstan, where 
the governors of the central bank are accountable to the president, the chairman of the 
CBR is accountable to the Parliament of Russian Federation (RF). The Parliament 
                                                          
19The volume of credits extended by commercial banks to the real sector increased by 77.3% in 2001 
reaching 14% of GDP, of which 3.6% of GDP were directed to small- and medium-sized enterprises (see 
Annual Report of the NBK for 2001). 
20See Article 36-2 of the law “On the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan” No. 2155, March 30, 
1995. 
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appoints and dismisses the chairman of the CBR on requests made by the president of 
Russia and the board of directors of the CBR. According to legislation, a key element of 
the legal status of the CBR is the principle of independence; the central bank should 
fulfill its functions independently from federal, regional, and local government bodies. 
However, as in the case of Kazakhstan the organization structure of the CBR’s 
administration has a channel that might limit the actual independence of the Bank. 
The management of the CBR consists of the collegiate body and the board of 
directors. The collegiate body, which includes the chairman of the CBR and officials 
from the president, government, parliament, and legislative organs, is responsible for 
reviewing reports of the CBR and authorizing proposals for main policy guidelines. The 
board of directors, which consists of the chairman and twelve members appointed by the 
parliament at the recommendation of the chairman, deals with monetary policy in 
collaboration with the government and decision-making on operational and managerial 
issues. Although legislation stipulates the segregation of duties between these two 
bodies,21 the influence of state agencies on the decision making process in the CBR is not 
excluded since all major policy and operational guidelines are the subject of approval by 
the highest body (e.g., the collegiate body). 
Legislation prohibits the central bank to finance directly and indirectly the 
government budget through extending loans and buying government securities in the 
primary market. However, in some cases the federal budget law can overlook this rule.22 
To demonstrate this, a comparison of the fiscal seigniorage and the monetary seigniorage 





                                                          
21 The members of the collegiate body except the chairman of the CBR are prohibited from working in the 
CBR on a full-time basis and, consequently, being paid for their work in the body. The members of the 
board of directors, in their turn, are prohibited from participating in political parties, religious 
organizations, the civil service, parliament, legislative and government bodies.  
22The Article 22 of the Law on the CBR stipulates:  “The Bank of Russia shall not be entitled to extend 
loans to the Russian Federation Government to finance the federal budget deficit and buy securities at their 



























Figure 4. Russia: monetary and fiscal seigniorage 
 
As Figure 4 shows, during the first two years (i.e., in 1997 and 1998) the CBR was 
extensively financing the government budget and only with the beginning of 
macroeconomic stabilization, which started in 1999 (Table 3 in Appendix), has the 
amount of seigniorage to the government decreased from the central bank. 
In 1997 the federal budget deficit reached 6.5% of GDP and the primary source of 
funds for the federal budget came from the CBR in the form of monetary seigniorage 
(1.9%). In particular, the operations of the CBR on the security market with government 
bonds were the major source of fiscal transfers: buying government bonds at the primary 
market contributed about 20% to budget transfers, and placing bonds in the secondary 
market contributed about 80%. It should be noted, however, that the government debt on 
bonds23 became the largest portion (87.2%) of its total domestic debt in 1997. With the 
instability of world financial markets, which caused a decrease of foreign investments to 
emerging markets including Russia, the internal crisis factors in Russia (e.g., budget 
deficit, large government debts, and depreciation of ruble) were intensified to such an 
extent that the government was no longer able to service its debt. On August 17, 1998, 
the Ministry of Finance of RF (MFRF) failed to meet its principal payments on 
government bonds and the government announced a default, suspending all its payments 
                                                          
23 Short term government bonds (GKO) and federal loan bonds (OFZ). 
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on bonds. As a result, the CBR stopped trading on both primary and secondary security 
markets. Government bonds24 issued before August 1998 were converted into eurobonds 
and restructured.  
In the second half of 1998, the federal budget no longer received any revenues 
from government securities. As a result, the budget deficit, which reached 8.2% of GDP 
in 1998, was financed, primarily, from the foreign reserves of the CBR, and the MFRF 
ran up a huge debt to the CBR on operations with government bonds. At the end of the 
year the amount of MFRF’s outstanding debt to the CBR rose to 208.6 billion rubles (or 
7.7% of GDP). The budget crisis (e.g., the government default, accumulation of a huge 
government debt, and the lack of funds to repay it) increased the dependence of monetary 
policy on the fiscal situation;  fiscal seigniorage of the CBR reached its peak level (10.6% 
of GDP) in 1998. It was financed by foreign reserves which caused a reduction of net 
investment by 3.8% of GDP; monetary seigniorage (2.3% of GDP); third party transfers 
and reserves (1.9% of GDP); and net interest revenues (0.1% of GDP). It should be noted 
that the remaining 2.9% of fiscal seigniorage was due to the book gains component. This 
is because the portfolio of the CBR included debt instruments in foreign currency such as 
government loan bonds25 and direct credits to the governments. Obviously, a sharp fall in 
the exchange rate against the USD (by 4 times) during the year increased the recorded 
value of these obligations in terms of the ruble, which amounted at the end of the year to 
about 169 bln. rubles (or 8.2 bln. USD). Thus, large depreciation of the ruble against the 
USD was reflected as a book gain component in fiscal seigniorage as well since a large 
portion of MFRF’s outstanding debt to the CBR was in foreign currency.          
The size of the fiscal seigniorage declined from 10.6% of GDP in 1998 to 0.3% of 
GDP in 1999 due to improvements in the field of government finance. The budget deficit 
in this period declined from 8.2% of GDP to 3.1% of GDP; however, difficulties in 
collecting taxes remained, and the MFRF continued to finance the budget deficit by 
monetary borrowing from the CBR. The central bank was buying from the MFRF, 
federal bonds under non-market conditions (e.g., without interest payments and on a 
                                                          
24 The government securities such as short-term bonds (GKO) and federal loan bonds (OFZ) issued in July, 
1998 were converted into eurobonds (see Annual Report of the CBR for 1998).  
25 These obligations included the government loan bonds issued in foreign currency (OVGVZ); eurobonds 
issued in 1996 to 1998; and bonds issued by the MFRF for GKO restructuring.  
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long-term basis with maturing dates from 2014 to 2023)26 and extending credits in 
foreign currency (4.5 bln. USD) to help the government service its foreign debt in time. 
Since the government began to restructure its debt incurred on securities issued earlier, a 
large part of federal loan bonds on the balance sheet of the CBR was due from 2018 to 
2029 with either low interest (2% p.a.) or no interest at all. At the end of the year, the 
debt of the MFRF to the CBR amounted to 513.5 billion rubles (7.4% of GDP) of which 
33.9% (about 174.1 bln. rubles) were obligations in foreign currency.  
In 2000,  the size of fiscal seigniorage  transferred  from  the  central  bank   to  
the government  switched  from  a positive (0.3% of GDP in 1999)  to  a  negative 
number  (-3.2% of GDP in 2000). This was caused by positive changes in the government 
finances, namely, a budget surplus (3.1% of GDP) that allowed the MFRF to meet its 
debt obligations without extensive borrowing from the CBR. The budget law, however, 
stipulated that the CBR would provide the government with 30 billion rubles (0.4% of 
GDP) through buying government securities at the primary market and with 1 billion 
USD through extending direct credit to the MFRF for foreign debt repayments. At the 
same time, the activation of investment activities in the economy and general banking 
stabilization allowed the central bank to increase its net investments to the private sector, 
which reached 7.6% of GDP by the end of 2000. 
 In 2001 the MFRF and the CBR completed the restructuring of government 
securities in the portfolio of the CBR into federal loan bonds. The years 2002 and 2003 
were of relatively high economic performance (the growth rate of GDP reached 4.3% and 
7.3% and the budget surplus without grants reached 0.6% of GDP and 1.1% of GDP, 
respectively). This allowed the MFRF to pay its debt obligations both in ruble and dollar 
denominations to the CBR. In 2003, the magnitude of fiscal seigniorage was small (-0.1% 
of GDP) and negative, indicating the fact the government restructured the government 




                                                          
26 See the Annual Report of CBR for 1999.  
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4. The welfare effect of monetary integration for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia 
Planned monetary integration among the three countries considered in the paper 
will redistribute accumulated seigniorage wealth and will generate a significant welfare 
effect in each country. The pattern and size of this effect will be different across the 
countries. In this section, we look more closely at possible ways to distribute seigniorage 
wealth27 in CMA and the potential gains or losses to be taken by each member country. 
Presumably, the distribution of seigniorage wealth created by CMA or, more precisely, 
the stake of seigniorage, which each country is going to receive after integration, will be 
determined by the initial endowment of a country in the equity capital of CEC. Therefore, 
the size of an equity share, which each participating country contributes to CEC, can be 
an important matter in negotiations towards integration. Below we consider three possible 
scenarios of determining equity shares and seigniorage division. 
Scenario I. The equity share of a member country is proportional to its weight in 
the total level of seigniorage wealth created by all countries by the time the common 
currency area is established and the central banks are no longer responsible for their 
monetary policies as separate institutions. Thus, seigniorage wealth is determined based 
on two balance sheet variables which stand just before the day the central bank joins the 
common currency area: the amount of monetary base minus interest bearing central bank 
reserves held by private banks. The intuition behind this scenario is that the amount of 
seigniorage wealth, which is collected in the pre-integration period, already reflects the 
level of seigniorage desired by the government since it depends on the rate of monetary 
expansion chosen by policymakers.  
Scenario II. The distribution of seigniorage revenues is similar to the case of 
seigniorage distribution in the EMU. In the case of the EMU, the distribution of 
seigniorage created by the ECB or, more precisely, the stake of seigniorage, which each 
member-country receives, is determined by the initial endowment of a country in the 
equity capital of the ECB. The equity share28 of a member state in the ECB is determined 
                                                          
27Seigniorage wealth is determined as the difference of the monetary base, which contains cash money 
circulated in the economy and central bank reserves held by the private banking system, and the portion of 
the private bank reserves on which the central bank pays interests. 
28The distribution of seigniorage wealth generated by the EMU among its member states is regulated by the 
Protocol on the “Statue of the European System of Central Banks and the ECB” (see articles 32.2 and 
32.5). 
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as the average contribution of GDP (in constant prices) and population values to the total 
GDP and population in the euro-zone. Therefore, the size of the equity share, which each 
member-country of the CMA will contribute to the CEC, can be treated as an important 
matter of negotiations towards integration in the case of CIS countries.  
Scenario III. This scenario is an adaptation of European rules to the conditions of 
CIS because given the fact that CIS countries have a large degree of state regulations and 
shadow economies, unlike EMU members, GDP in constant prices might not be relevant 
for this study. Therefore, we use GDP adjusted by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) instead 
of GDP in constant prices and compare the real economic potential of CIS member 
countries. In order to calculate the equity shares of CIS member states in the CMA, the 
average GDP (adjusted by PPP) for the period 2000 to 2003 expressed in US dollar and 
population value for 2003 are used. We use the average value of GDP over the period 
2000 to 2003 in order to smooth short-term shifts.  
The share of interest bearing private bank assets (e.g., time deposits, security 
repurchase [REPO] operations), which are held in the central bank and accrue interest, in 
the monetary base is quite low in all countries (less than 2-3% of the monetary base on 
average during the analyzed period). In contrast, mandatory reserve requirements which 
force private banks to keep a part of their assets in the central bank are large. In 
particular, the required reserve-deposit ratio in all three countries significantly exceeds 
the threshold level (4%) which distinguish, according to Sinn and Feist (1997), a highly 
regulated banking system.29 This suggests in all three countries the liquidity of private 
banks for commercial financial operation is very limited. 
However, preparations towards integration may involve some liberalization and 
development of the banking sector which will lead to an increase in the portion of interest 
bearing reserves in the monetary base and in the liquidity of commercial banks. This 
implies that the share of each country in the total seigniorage wealth will change from the 
current state, and the pattern of this change will depend on the degree and speed of 
banking liberalization. If the banking sectors in three countries are liberalized with 
different degrees and speeds, this will change the composition of the monetary base in 
                                                          
29In more liberal banking systems the reserve-deposit ratio usually does not exceed 2% (Feist and Sinn 
1997). 
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terms of interest bearing and non-interest bearing private bank reserves and will 
eventually alter the share of each country in total seigniorage wealth. In this respect, a 
simplified rule of seigniorage distribution described in Scenario 1, which is based on 
seigniorage wealth created by the three countries in an environment of a highly regulated 
banking system, will not be preferred. So most probably, the basic scheme of integration 
among CIS countries will look like the EMU version of integration since the main policy 
strategies towards CEA and CMA are very similar to EU and EMU guidelines.30  
The welfare effect of CMA under Scenario 2 is determined as the difference of 
the equity and seigniorage weights of its member country multiplied by the total amount 
of seigniorage wealth accumulated by all countries by the end of 2003. Consequently, the 
size of countries in terms of population and GDP, which determine the size of equity 
share, on the one hand, and the amount of seigniorage wealth generated in the pre-
integration period, on the other, would be important elements of the welfare effect. The 
equity shares of participating countries calculated according to our three scenarios are 
presented in Table 1.  
                                                          
30 See Concept on the Establishment of the Common Economic Area of September 19, 2003 (draft in 
Russian).  
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in CMA (%) 
Belarus 1 629 204 2 156.00 756 1.18 1.18
Kazakhstan 308 144 144.22 2 137 3.34 3.34
Russia 1 796 900 29.45 61 006 95.47 95.47















Belarus 9.88 14.34 5.87 3.84 4.86
Kazakhstan 14.91 24.00 8.86 6.43 7.64
Russia 143.43 335.14 85.26 89.73 87.50
Total 168.22 373.49 100.00 100.00 100.00
Scenario 3 Population 
(mln. people) 
GDP by PPP 
(constant 1995),  








Belarus 9.88 46.23 5.87 4.11 4.99
Kazakhstan 14.91 69.86 8.86 6.21 7.54
Russia 143.43 1 008.37 85.26 89.68 87.47
Total 168.22 1 124.46 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources: National Statistic Committees of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia; Annual Reports of the NBRB, 
the NBK, and the CBR 
 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates under Scenario 1, when countries are assumed to contribute to 
the common emitting center the accumulated seigniorage wealth, Russia has the largest 
equity share (95.5%) and Belarus the smallest (1.2%).  
In Scenario 2, under which the equity shares are calculated similar to EMU rules, 
the share of Russia is somewhat smaller (87.5%), while the shares of Belarus and 
Kazakhstan increase significantly from 1.1% to 4.9% and 3.3% to 7.6%, respectively. 
This is because both population and GDP shares of Belarus and Kazakhstan, unlike those 
of Russia, are much larger than their corresponding shares in the total seigniorage wealth 
accumulated by all countries.  Under Scenario 3, where GDP adjusted by PPP is used, the 
equity share of Russia is almost the same as in the previous case (87.5%). However, a 
small increase in the weight of Belarus by 0.1% contributes to an increase in its welfare 
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gains by 86.4 million USD. Correspondingly, a decrease in the weight of Kazakhstan (by 
0.1%) leads to a decrease in its welfare gain by 68.4 mln. USD.  
Based on estimated values of the equity share, the pattern and scale of the welfare 
effect in each participating country is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Welfare effect of monetary integration 
 Equity share 
in CMA (%)
Seigniorage wealth 











Belarus 4.86 755.66 1.18 2 347.72 237.62
Kazakhstan 7.64 2 136.62 3.34 2 748.04 184.31
Russia 87.50 61 005.96 95.47 -5 095.76 -35.53
Total 100.00 63 898.24 100.00 0.00 # 
Scenario 3 
Belarus 6.06 755.66 1.18 2 434.16 246.37
Kazakhstan 8.59 2 136.62 3.34 2 679.67 179.72
Russia 85.35 61 005.96 95.47 -5 113.83 -35.65
Total 100.00 63 898.24 100.00 0.00 # 
Sources: Annual Reports of the NBRB, the NBK, the CBR, and the author’s calculations 
 
 
According to the results, which are based on a comparison of the equity shares of 
participating countries with their corresponding seigniorage shares in CMA, Russia 
would lose in all considered scenarios, while Kazakhstan and Belarus would gain. As 
Table 2 reveals, the loss to be taken by Russia is quite large with an estimate of about 5 
bln. USD in both alternative scenarios. Kazakhstan and Belarus, on the contrary, would 
enjoy a big welfare gain. In particular, the sizes of a welfare gain per capita to be taken 
by Belarus and Kazakhstan are 237.6 USD and 184.3 USD under Scenario 2 and 246.4 
USD and 179.7 USD under Scenario 3, respectively.  
One of the reasons for welfare transfers among countries within a monetary union 
is related to the existence of differences in banking regulations and the level of 
seigniorage wealth collected during the pre-integration period (Sinn and Feist 1997, 
2000). Specifically, a country with a highly regulated banking system and with strict 
requirements to private banks usually loses when it integrates with a country where 
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private banks have more flexibility to manage their liquidity. This is because in the 
environment of strict regulations the amount of reserves, which is required by the central 
bank, is high relative to the opposite case. As a result, the share of a country in the total 
seigniorage wealth of integrating countries is significantly larger than its equity share in 
the common emitting center, and the welfare effect is always negative. In contrast, a 
country with a more liberal banking system usually gains since its monetary base is not 
significantly large compared to countries with a more regulated banking system.  
Large welfare transfers among countries can also stem from differences in 
national wealth (Cukrowski and Fischer 2002). This is because the population share of 
poorer countries in a monetary union are much larger than their respective GDP shares; 
consequently, their larger capital shares relative to the share of seigniorage wealth in a 
common pool will allow them to receive a larger portion of seigniorage. Along with the 
size of countries in terms of population and GDP and differences among countries in 
banking regulations, welfare transfer between economically large and small countries 
takes place also because of political reasons (Casella 1992).  
 
5. Conclusion 
In light of a recent trend in the CIS towards monetary integration among Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia, the present paper analyzis the importance of seigniorage 
revenues in these countries during 1997 to 2003, possible ways to distribute seigniorage 
in the CMA, and the expected welfare effect of monetary integration. The concept of total 
gross seigniorage, which allows one to analyze seigniorage in the broadest possible sense 
as the sum of all revenue flows from the central bank to the government, is applied. 
Namely, we explored and compared across three countries the process of generating and 
allocating seigniorage (e.g., its four main sources and uses), taking into account the legal, 
institutional, and operational arrangements of their central banks and giving special 
attention to the magnitude of fiscal seigniorage transferred to the government. Based on 
three alternative scenarios of seigniorage division among the member countries of the 
CMA, the distribution of gain or loss across countries is estimated.  
Empirical results reveal that the manner of collecting seigniorage revenues by the 
central banks is similar across the countries (monetary expansion is a main source of 
 37
seigniorage revenues and revenues obtained on interest earnings and financial operations 
are low). The structure of seigniorage in terms of its distribution is a bit different both 
across countries and time. Before 1999, the monetary authorities of Belarus and Russia 
used a large portion of their seigniorage revenues for financing the state budget while the 
central bank of Kazakhstan used it for reserve funds. From 1999 onwards, the magnitude 
of fiscal seigniorage shows a declining tendency (especially in Russia). The comparison 
of fiscal seigniorage across countries after 1999 suggests that the government of Belarus, 
which gives its central bank very limited autonomy, more strongly relies on seigniorage 
revenues to finance its state budget than in Kazakhstan and Russia. In these countries, the 
situation is different since those governments obtain substantial revenues from the oil 
sectors and central banks have more political and economic independence.  
The analysis of a welfare impact of monetary integration suggests that Russia 
would shoulder a welfare loss while Kazakhstan and Belarus would gain substantially. 
This is because the share of Russia in the seigniorage wealth of all countries is much 
larger than its equity share in the capital of CEC. This finding is consistent with earlier 
findings (Cukrowski and Fischer 2002) that show a large disparity in the economic size 
translates to a transfer of seigniorage wealth from large to small countries (the smaller the 
country is in terms of GDP and population, the larger the amount of welfare gain). 
Welfare transfer among three countries can be interpreted in the context of distribution of 
power over common decisions in monetary union (Casella 1992), which is left for further 
research. Results presented in this paper should be useful in negotiations among the 
member states towards integration and in the determining rules regulating the distribution 
of seigniorage wealth in the common area. 
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Appendix: Tables 





Balance sheet (mln.rubles,  
as of end of the period) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Assets  
Foreign assets 12 333 76 465 98 355 423 560 706 179 1 439 900 1 788 900
Domestic assets, claims on:  
   -government 14 448 54 930 153 755 302 799 504 345 190 416 643 263
   -resident credit institutions 17 046 51 229 60 226 107 082 180 557 255 447 332 130
Other assets 172 365 2 085 7 547 12 577 17 019 23 521
Total assets 43 999 182 989 314 421 840 988 1 403 658 1 902 782 2 787 814
Liabilities  
Foreign liabilities 9 791 70 720 81 722 245 979 344 175 593 814 650 394
Domestic liabilities  
   Banknotes in circulation 12 300 27 074 86 852 238 796 512 211 650 020 926 438
   Government funds 2 010 6 490 15 072 41 741 35 100 22 569 126 677
   Funds of resident credit 
   Institutions 
12 915 39 227 97 828 175 539 332 744 466 270 760 352
   Other liabilities 23 81 139 306 757 2 186
Total liabilities 37 038 143 591 281 614 702 361 1 224 987 1 732 675 2 464 047
Capital and reserves 3 694 5 968 24 895 129 194 185 695 311 865 474 978
Other items(net) 3 266 33 430 7 912 9 433 -7 024 -141 758 -151 211
The sum of liabilities 43 999 182 989 314 421 840 988 1 403 658 1 902 782 2 787 814
Financial report  
(mln.rubles, flow per year) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Interest incomes 1 773 4 059 13 919 30 496 82 124 66 314 93 819
Interest payments -1 850 -3 812 -8 132 -13 900 -18 648 -29 763 -57 651
Net interest incomes  -77 246 5 787 16 596 63 476 36 551 36 167
Other net incomes  4 149 4 458 35 914 28 605 22 390 63 943 82 718
Income before provision for 
losses 
4 072 4 704 41 701 45 201 85 866 104 921 119 230
Provisions for possible losses -970 -1 892 -3 378 -8 399 -13 042 -4 978 -864,2
Operational income (after 
using provisions for losses) 




   staff expenses; -321 -661 -2 578 -8 000 -17 139 -25 615 -31 685
   depreciation; -48 -97 -229 -1 627 -4 887 -13 986 -15 036
   banknotes and coin issue;  -1 -110 -1 794 -1 695 -1 447 -1 929 -3 777
   Administrative expenses -237 -488 -2 888 -6 728 -24 235 -29 760 -34 229
Transfers to the budget -1 331 -1 206 -15 727 -16 291 -12 558 -13 977 -16 819
Net profit after transfer 
payments 




Balance sheet  
(mln. tenges,  
















Foreign assets 172 971 164 663 276 713 302 950 565 816 788 081 1 241 530
Domestic assets, claims on:  
  - government 77 078 87 931 109 304 41 568 19 133 19 230 2 946
  - resident credit institutions 8 248 2 084 4 634 2 774 1 810 3 758 3 150
Other assets 620 7 277 12 657 2 146 3 586 4 060 6 349
Total assets 258 918 261 954 403 308 349 438 590 345 815 129 1 253 975
Liabilities  
Foreign liabilities 42 409 56 354 66 097 286 346 390 6 543
Domestic liabilities  
  Banknotes and coins in  
  circulation 
92 796 68 728 103 486 106 428 131 174 161 701 238 730
  Government funds 53 647 59 766 93 899 57 507 256 768 356 425 570 924
  Funds of resident credit  
  institutions 
22 593 12 700 23 263 27 988 44 377 46 470 78 142
  Other liabilities 6 872 12 093 7 313 49 882 18 547 65 304 205 763
Total liabilities 218 318 209 641 294 058 242 090 451 212 630 290 1 100 102
Capital and reserves 52 611 63 480 121 957 118 963 134 371 179 834 167 299
Other items (net) -12 012 -11 167 -12 707 -11 615 4 761 5 005 -13 424
The sum of liabilities 270 929 273 121 416 015 361 053 585 583 815 129 1 253 978
Financial report  
(mln.tenges, flow per year) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Interest incomes 5 628 5 654 7 813 17 126 29 373 21 446 15 538
Interest payments -3 701 -3 058 -4 555 -4 775 -11 453 -6 448 -12 597
Net interest incomes  1 927 2 595 3 257 12 351 17 920 14 998 2 941
Other net incomes  3 159 3 107 8 582 17 165 16 706 47 578 -1 742
Income before provision for 
losses 
5 087 5 702 11 839 29 516 34 626 62 576 1 199
Provisions for possible losses -185 -1 294 -3 805 -16 010 -9 761 -5 834 12 606
Operational income 
(after using provisions for 
losses) 




   staff expenses; -719 -977 -1 144 -2 086 -2 766 -2 878 -3 221
   depreciation; -456 -686 -425 -1 414 -664 -1 028 -1 104
   banknotes and coin issue; -602 -229 -654 -786 -1 118 -1 085 -2 736
   other administrative  
   expenses 
-2 719 -2 316 -2 671 -2 404 -1 506 -1 557 -1 713
Transfers to the budget  -406 -109 -3 202 -5 795 -6 234 -10 519 -5 691
Net profit after transfer  
payments 





Balance sheet  
(mln. rubles,  
















Foreign assets 123 344 286 324 383 899 842 445 1 163 850 1 615 680 2 391 100
Domestic assets, claims on:  
  - government 226 049 525 374 572 030 504 702 488 102 551 547 477 640
  - resident credit institutions 11 119 76 438 202 944 206 501 250 187 223 991 198 742
Other assets 327 562 430 367 248 2 239 2 319
Total assets 360 839 888 698 1 159 303 1 554 015 1 902 387 2 393 457 3 069 801
Liabilities  
Foreign liabilities 79 744 401 551 424 201 331 056 287 413 233 030 220 638
Domestic liabilities  
  Banknotes and coins in  
  circulation 
130 474 187 679 266 146 418 871 583 839 763 245 1 147 040
  Government funds 21 313 41 863 75 872 240 488 294 914 357 878 446 001
  Funds of resident credit  
  institutions 
79 976 75 996 173 597 320 887 367 455 500 485 800 670
  Other liabilities 240 1 828 1 575 7 2 29 5
Total liabilities 311 747 708 917 941 391 1 311 309 1 533 623 1 854 667 2 614 354
Capital and reserves 69 552 118 113 151 844 166 048 242 312 364 731 298 727
Other items (net) -20 460 61 668 66 068 76 658 126 452 174 059 156 720
The sum of liabilities 360 839 888 698 1 159 303 1 554 015 1 902 387 2 393 457 3 069 801
Financial report 
 (mln. rubles, flow per year) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Interest incomes 2 056 4 072 4 399 27 848 36 549 46 914 44 862
Interest payments -1 089 -1 774 -7 489 -10 337 -8 124 -8 189 -3 083
Net interest incomes  967 2 298 -3 090 17 511 28 425 38 725 41 779
Other net incomes from 
financial operations 
14 968 3 324 48 839 46 508 59 905 47 914 64 143
Income before provision for 
losses 
15 935 5 622 45 749 64 019 88 330 86 639 105 922
Provisions for possible losses -2 966 -12 537 -19 486 -31 497 -26 367 0 0
Operational income (after 
using provisions for losses) 




   staff expenses; -7 463 -8 601 -11 113 -13 727 -21 055 -28 870 -29 196
   banknotes and coin issue; -1 098 -1 930 -1 550 -2 207 -2 597 -2 767 -3 139
   other administrative  
   expenses; 
-1 621 -10 383 -12 415 -12 409 -20 228 -22 628 -18 859
Transfers to the budget -1 985 0 -593 -2 090 -9 042 -24 923 -29 806
Net profit after transfer 
payments 
802 -27 829 592 2 089 9 041 7 451 24 922
Sources: IFS (2004), Annual Reports of the NBRB, the NBK, and the CBR 
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Table 2. Sources and uses of seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (% of GDP) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total seigniorage (st) 
           Belarus 4.68 8.48 5.26 3.41 3.29 2.82 2.21 
           Kazakhstan 2.39 2.63 6.61 2.17 9.07 5.21 7.81 
           Russia 2.59 9.80 4.27 7.70 4.22 4.02 6.93 
The sources of seigniorage 
     Monetary seigniorage (sM) 
           Belarus 3.56 5.85 3.91 2.51 2.51 1.04 1.59 
           Kazakhstan 1.86 -1.96* 2.25 0.29 1.27 0.86 2.44 
           Russia 1.94 2.25 3.67 4.10 2.43 2.77 5.14 
     Net interest revenues (sI) 
           Belarus -0.02* 0.04 0.19 0.18 0.37 0.14 0.10 
           Kazakhstan 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.48 0.55 0.40 0.07 
           Russia 0.04 0.09 -0.06* 0.24 0.32 0.36 0.31 
     Net revenues from CB operations (sOP) 
           Belarus 0.87 0.37 1.08 0.22 0.05 0.24 0.23 
           Kazakhstan 0.18 0.10 0.24 0.04 0.21 1.11 0.24 
           Russia 0.51 -0.35* 0.61 0.21 0.37 0.44 0.48 
     Book gains (sRI) 
           Belarus 0.25 2.23 0.09 0.49 0.35 0.30 0.29 
           Kazakhstan 0.15 0.82 3.49 0.37 0.41 0.49 -1.32* 
           Russia 0.10 4.09 -0.70* -0.02* 0.41 0.45 -0.76* 
The uses of seigniorage 
     The costs of printing notes and  maintaining operations (sC) 
           Belarus 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.24 
           Kazakhstan 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.20 
           Russia 0.43 0.80 0.52 0.39 0.49 0.50 0.38 
     Net investment (sNI) 
           Belarus 3.26 5.34 0.71 2.33 1.53 2.16 1.04 
           Kazakhstan 1.55 -1.56** 5.71 1.43 9.06 4.71 6.93 
           Russia 0.47 -3.38** 4.19 7.62 4.63 4.34 5.73 
     Reserves, capital and transfers from(-)/to(+) parties (sO) 
           Belarus -0.48** -2.36** 0.80 -0.64** 0.19 0.39 -0.09**
           Kazakhstan 0.58 0.15 0.66 0.48 -0.18** 0.33 -0.64**
           Russia 0.22 -1.95** -1.47** -0.33** -0.90** -1.05** 0.05 
     Fiscal seigniorage (sG) 
           Belarus 1.71 5.30 3.50 1.52 1.29 -1.10** 1.02 
           Kazakhstan -0.09** 0.28 -0.47** -0.98** -6.63** -2.36** -5.06**
           Russia 1.47 10.60 0.27 -3.15** -0.69** 0.23 -0.99**
*)   Negative values relate to the uses of seigniorage 
**) Negative values relate to the sources of seigniorage 
Source: IFS (2004), Annual Reports of the NBRB, the NBK, and the CBR, and author’s calculations  
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Table 3. Macroeconomic indicators in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia during 1997-2003  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Belarus 
GDP growth (annual %)  11.40 8.40 3.40 5.80 4.70 5.00 6.75
Inflation (annual %)  63.92 72.89 293.68 168.62 61.13 42.54 28.40
Overall budget balance including 
grants (% of GDP)  
-1.56 -0.85 -1.99 -0.08 -1.90 -1.80 -1.20
Money and quasi money growth 
(annual %) 
111.36 276.00 132.65 219.27 58.86 53.52 56.81
Current account balance  
(% of GDP)  
-6.09 -6.66 -1.60 -2.54 -3.51 -2.64 -3.00
Net capital account (mln.USD)  133.20 170.10 60.40 69.40 56.30 52.70 68.9
External debt, total (mln.USD)  1171.20 10110 886 898 1142 1439 1438
Exchange rate (BYR/USD, end 
of the period) 
30.74 220.00 320.00 1 180.00 1 580.00 1 920.00 2 156.00
Kazakhstan 
GDP growth (annual %)  1.70 -1.90 2.70 9.80 13.50 9.80 9.20
Inflation (annual %)  17.39 7.12 8.31 13.16 8.36 5.85 6.80
Overall budget balance 
 (% of GDP)  
-3.58 -8.10 -5.20 -1.00 -0.90 0.30 -0.90
Money and quasi money growth 
(annual %)  
24.06 -14.13 84.37 44.96 40.20 30.06 29.27
Current account balance 
 (% of GDP)  
-3.61 -5.53 -1.01 3.69 -5.01 -2.82 -0.23
Net capital account  
(mln USD)  
-439.80 -369.10 -234.00 -290.60 -194.02 -119.90 -28.79
External debt, total (mln. USD)  4 078.00 9 932.00 12 081.40 12 685.40 15 158.20 18 201.30 22 859.00
Exchange rate (KZT/USD,  
end of the period) 
75.55 83.80 138.20 144.50 150.94 155.85 144.22
Russia 
GDP growth (annual %)  0.90 -4.90 5.40 9.00 5.00 4.30 7.3
Inflation (annual %)  14.74 27.67 85.68 20.75 21.49 15.79 15.10
Overall budget balance,  
Including grants (% of GDP)  
-6.50 -8.24 -3.10 3.10 2.70 0.60 1.10
Money and quasi money growth 
(annual %)  
27.96 37.47 56.64 58.42 36.08 33.93 38.54
Current account balance 
 (% of GDP)  
-0.02 0.08 12.56 18.04 10.83 8.63 8.28
Net capital account (bln.USD)  -0.79 -0.38 -0.33 10.95 -9.35  -12.39 -0.99
External debt, total (bln.USD)  127.62 185.66 177.10 158.30 150.40 153.20 182.10
Exchange rate (RUR/USD), 
end of the period 
5.96 20.65 27.00 28.16 30.14 31.78 29.45
Source: the Ministry of Finance of Belarus, the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Finance 
of Russia, World Development Indicator (2004), IFS (2004), EBRD Transition Report (2004) 
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Labor Market Flexibility, International Competitiveness  
and Patterns of Trade 
 
Ainura Uzagalieva*
The paper focuses on the question of how labor market regulations can affect a country’s 
competitive position in international trade and international trade patterns. The analysis 
shows that differences in labor market flexibility between countries affect their 
competitive positions in international markets and can serve as an independent cause of 
international trade. It is argued that an increase in labor market flexibility may change the 
relative price of goods within the country making it more competitive in international 
markets for commodities with uncertain demand. Changes in relative prices can alter 
countries’ comparative advantage and thus international trade patterns. Furthermore, it is 
shown that due to the differences in relative prices resulting from different labor market 
regulations, international trade between countries can be observed even if they are 
identical in all respects (e.g., labor productivity and production technology). Data reveal 
that a country with a more flexible labor market has comparative advantage in, and tends 
to export, goods with more variable demand (e.g., fashionable clothes, seasonal toys), 
while a country with a more rigid labor market has a comparative advantage in, and tends 












* I am indebted to Jacek Cukrowski for his collaboration and valuable comments in developing this paper. I 
am grateful to Randal Filer, Lubomir Lizal, Sergej Slobodyan, Kresmir Zigic, and Sarah Peck for useful 






International trade plays a key role in the strategies of poverty reduction, 
economic growth and affects overall national development. In many cases, however, 
geographical location, high transportation costs or the lack of advanced technologies do 
not allow countries to benefit from international exchange. There exist regions where 
countries with similar technological levels, climate conditions and regulatory framework, 
lacking a clear comparative advantage, compete with each other on international markets 
and, except for some trade in natural resources, cannot fully explore benefits of 
international exchange within and outside the region.  
Most of the factors (e.g., geographical location, high transportation costs, climate 
conditions, and the lack of advanced technologies) that affect countries’ comparative 
advantage cannot be changed by policymakers. However, appropriate institutional 
settings and regulations determining business conditions can increase economic 
efficiency, decrease domestic prices of selected products, and thus, increase a country’s 
price competitiveness on international markets. Although general links between business 
environment and price competitiveness seem to be clear, the impact of various policy 
measures on producers and market prices needs to be clarified in many cases. This study 
focuses on the relation between labor market regulations, international competitiveness,31 
and patterns of trade. Specifically, we argue that policy measures which increase labor 
market flexibility may change the relative price of goods within a country, making it 
more competitive in international markets for commodities with volatile demand,32 and, 
consequently, that flexibility of the labor market can be considered an important factor 
that would stimulate exports of a broad range of products, especially those with high 
demand volatility.  
Another important theoretical point to be gained from this study is that since an 
increase in labor market flexibility may change the relative price of goods within the 
                                                          
31We refer to the academic definition of international competitiveness which is: “Competitiveness of 
Nations is a field of Economic theory, which analyzes the facts and policies that shape the ability of a 
nation to create and maintain an environment that sustains more value creation for its enterprises and more 
prosperity for its people” [see International Institute for Management Development (IMD) World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY): 2003]. 
32 The group of products with volatile demand includes seasonal products (e.g., processed meat, fish, fruit, 
vegetables, and fats), clothes, toys and other items related to, for example, fashionable movies. 
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country, it can also alter countries’ comparative advantage and thus international trade 
patterns. In particular, we show that due to the differences in relative prices, which result 
from different labor market regulations, international trade between countries can be 
observed even if the countries are identical in all respects (e.g., labor productivity, 
production technology, and consumption preferences). The analysis reveals that a country 
with a more flexible labor market has comparative advantage in, and tends to export, 
goods with more variable demand, while a country with a more rigid labor market has 
comparative advantage in, and tends to export, commodities with more stable demand.  
The analysis presented in this paper has been motivated by an observation that 
within a single industry commodities with relatively stable demand are produced 
throughout the world, while very similar goods with more volatile demand are produced 
in particular countries only. One can think about the textile or toy industry where 
products with relatively stable demand (e.g., traditional clothing ) are produced in both 
developed (with high wages) as well as developing (with low wages) countries, while 
technologically similar products with more volatile demand (e.g., ethnic-style clothing, 
toys, cards, CDs, and similar products such as movie tie-ins, for example, Star Wars, 
Matrix, The Lord of the Rings, and Harry Potter) are produced exclusively in developing 
countries with very liberal labor market regulations.33 Another example includes the 
export of watches and clocks,34 which have more stable demand on the world markets 
and are produced throughout the world, versus agricultural goods with high variability 
such as meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, and fats which have a larger share in the exports of 
developing countries. This simple example shows that large scale production of goods 
with volatile demand, and their export to international markets, may significantly 
                                                          
33The market for such products is huge. To illustrate the scale, one can consider solely the market for Harry 
Potter related products, where the total earnings (until the summer of 2003) from the sales of books, 
movies, video tapes, CDs, video games, and clothes exceeded 3.5 billion USD. In other words, the total 
earnings from such products exceed the yearly GDP of a number of developing countries (for comparison, 
the GDP of the Kyrgyz Republic amounted to 1.7 billion USD in 2003). See the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank (IBRD/WB), 2005: World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
34The comparison of export shares (61 products) across 37 countries based on the standard deviation of 
each product’s sales shows that the watches and clocks group has the lowest variation (0.001), while the 
group of processed meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, and fats has the highest variation of sales (0.194) during the 
period from 1995 to 2002.  
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improve countries’ balance of payments and could have a positive impact on the 
economy as a whole.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the concept of labor 
market flexibility. Section 3 focuses on the speed of labor market adjustment to new 
market conditions. An autarky regime in a simple Ricardian setting under price 
uncertainty is analyzed in section 4. Section 5 explores the impact of labor market 
flexibility on international trade. In section 6 key theoretical results are confronted with 
empirical data and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The concept of labor market flexibility 
The concept of labor market flexibility refers to various phenomena and can be 
defined by at least three of the following important dimensions (Hamermesh 1996; 
Pissarides 1997). First, it is related to organizational and productive aspects at the 
company level, namely, to the ability of a firm to vary its production volume and to 
introduce new models and products. Second, it refers to the capacity and skills of 
employees (e.g., building multiple skills, training workers for different production 
operations, and tasks). Third, it is applied to employment policies, wage adjustments, 
changes in work schedules, and hiring and firing procedures consistent with production 
needs.35 Labor market flexibility is also related to the population aging phenomenon 
since old workers are generally less mobile and incur high costs resulting from firms’ 
adjustment to demand shocks (Kuhn 2003).    
Although labor market flexibility can be related to several phenomena, it can be 
characterized by the speed of adjustment in response to various shocks in an economy 
(Pissarides 1997). The virtue of the latter is that one labor market is more flexible than 
the other one if it adjusts to a given shock faster. In a perfectly flexible labor market, 
workers are free to allocate their services in response to shifting relative wage 
opportunities, while firms are free to adjust the workforce in response to shifting relative 
profit opportunities. Moreover, it is assumed that both workers and firms adapt 
immediately to any changes in market conditions and in labor demand.36
                                                          
35 These include, for example, contracts for certain tasks, part-time work or at-home work. 
36 Departing from a neoclassical model (perfectly flexible labor market), decreasing labor market flexibility 
leads to the other theoretical extreme: the Keynesian concept of rigid labor market (rigid real wages). 
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In real life, however, there are several constraints that limit the ability of firms and 
workers to quickly adjust to changing market conditions and labor demand. Employment 
protection is one of them. It refers to hiring and firing practices on unfair dismissals, lay-
off restrictions, severance payments, minimum notice periods, and security against job 
dismissals. Employment protection can originate from various institutional arrangements. 
When labor markets are not regulated, employment protection is based on wage 
compensation schemes and collective bargaining. Namely, firms with high dismissal rates 
pay workers a compensating wage for occupational hazards. This fact causes firms to 
implement either an adjustment strategy, through retraining workers and marginal 
regulations (e.g., attrition, early retirement, work sharing, and severance payments), or 
firing workers and accepting higher compensating wages. The problems of permanent 
lay-offs are dealt by unions which represent a collective bargaining mechanism for 
protecting work places. However, when markets fail (e.g., externalities, imperfect 
competition, insufficient information, and public goods), the wage compensation 
mechanism and collective bargaining do not work. In this case governments legislate 
employment protection through imposing restrictions of different kinds. According to the 
World Bank (WB), the constraints of labor market flexibility can be ordered from the 
most (1) to the least (5) severe: 1) hiring difficulties; 2) hours rigidities; 3) firing 
difficulties; 4) employment rigidities; and 5) firing costs.37  
Three basic types of employment protection measures are distinguished in the 
literature (Bertola, Boeri, Cazes 1999; Boeri, Nicoletti, Scarpetta 2000; Hamermesh 
1996). The first type includes provisions affecting fixed costs per worker (e.g., the 
statutory guarantees of payments to workers, various agreements to limit overtime or 
provide shorter working time). The second type includes provisions that affect the cost of 
labor adjustment (e.g., redundancy payments, subsidies to retain employees and 
provisions for unfair dismissals).38 The third type consists of provisions affecting the 
process of labor adjustment such as lay-offs by inverse seniority, restrictions on hiring, 
and various pre-notifications regarding factory closings or redundancies.  
                                                          
37See the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank (IBRD/WB), 2005: 
Doing business in 2005.  
38Statutory rights against unfair dismissals exist in all countries except the United States (see Bertola, 
Boeri, and Cazes 1999). 
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No matter what the type of employment protection and which institutional 
measures it originates from, any kind of employment protection arrangements, enforcing 
hiring and firing rules, unemployment benefits, and minimum wages are regarded as 
factors decreasing labor market flexibility. These factors constrain the free choice of 
workers and firms and increase the inertia of the labor market (i.e., reduce the speed of 
labor adjustment to new market conditions). Not going into the details of labor market 
regulations, in this paper, following Pissarides (1997), we assume that one labor market is 
more flexible than the other one if firms can faster adjust employment to the new market 
conditions.  
 
3.  The speed of labor market adjustment and a firm’s input-output decisions 
As discussed in the preceding section, we assume that if the labor market is 
perfectly flexible, firms are able to adjust the amount of labor needed in the production 
process to observed market conditions immediately. Any decrease in labor market 
flexibility makes the adjustments of labor input slower, i.e., increases labor market 
inertia. Since labor market regulations are usually the same for all sectors in the 
economy, in the deterministic case (i.e., when the demand for goods is certain) they 
should have the same impact on all industries. Therefore, labor market regulations would 
not affect relative prices, and thus, a country’s comparative advantage. Under uncertainty 
of demand, however, all inputs in the production process which are not perfectly flexible 
(i.e., cannot be adjusted immediately) need to be chosen before the output is produced 
and the price of real output is observed. Provided that firms are not risk neutral, but risk-
averse,39 the uncertainty about output price affects the optimal input/output decisions of 
firms (Leland 1972; Yu and Ingene 1993) and, consequently, the relative prices of goods 
with different output price variability. 
To clarify the relationship between the uncertainty of output price and firms’ 
optimal input/output decisions, consider a single commodity market and assume that the 
price of the unit of output produced is uncertain and can be represented as the sum of two 
terms, a fixed term (expected value) and a random term (ηt) at any period of time t (t is an 
                                                          
39A similar assumption was made by Sandmo (1971), Leland (1972), Cukrowski and Aksen (2003) and 
Cukrowski, Fischer and Aksen (2002). As indicated by Leland, risk neutrality is frequently assumed just for the 
sake of simplicity (see Leland, 1972, for detailed discussion).  
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integer number such that −∞<t<+∞). For the sake of simplicity, assume that the random 
variables (ηt) are identically distributed with zero mean and finite variance (σt2). Assume, 
moreover, that the random deviations from the mean price (ηt) are described by a 
stationary stochastic process with a memory (e.g., by the auto-regressive processes of any 
order). This means that the variance and covariance of random variables (ηt) are invariant 
with respect to displacement in time (i.e., Var(ηt)=Var(η)=σ2>0, Cov(ηt,ηt+s)≠0 for 
s=0,1,..., and integer valued t (−∞<t<+∞), and that firms can observe real values of ηt at 
each period).  
Since various labor market regulations, which result in a different degree of labor 
market flexibility, affect the speed of labor adjustment to changing market conditions, 
they also determine the time interval needed for labor input fine-tuning. In other words, 
the degree of labor market flexibility determines the time length between the moment 
when a firm’s decision on its input/output plan is enacted and the moment when its 
output is supplied to the market and real output price is observed. Note that if the labor 
market is not perfectly flexible, the firm’s input/output decision needs to be made before 
the real demand is known (based on forecasts). Consequently, in the moment of decision 
making perceived market price variability is inversely related to the flexibility of the 
labor market. This is  because  the forecast error of deviation from an expected demand 
equals zero and its variance increases with the time elapsed from observations to the 
moment when real output price is revealed  (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991). For example, 
if  random deviations follow  the first-order autoregressive process [e.g., ηt=φ1ηt-1+εt, 
where  φ1  is a  constant parameter and εt  is a random disturbance  term with  zero mean 
and  variance  σε2  under the normal distribution N(0, σε2)], the s period forecast 
estimated in period T, ηtf(s), is  ηtf(s)=φ1sηT. The forecast error of s periods  ahead,  eT(s), 
is given as eT(s)=εT+s+φ1εT+s-1+…+φ1s-1εT+1, and it has a variance 














Figure 1. Forecast errors in a first-order autoregressive process 
 
4. Price uncertainty and an autarky regime in a Ricardian setting 
For the sake of simplicity the analysis which follows is based on the international 
trade model in a simple Ricardian setting. The original model is extended by assuming 
that demand for one good (out of two goods considered) is uncertain. More precisely, two 
goods, X and Y, are produced in a perfectly competitive environment, but there is always 
uncertainty about the price of the first good (X). The technology is summarized by the 
productivity of labor, which is expressed in terms of the unit labor requirement (i.e., the 
number of hours required to produce one unit of each good) in each industry. For future 
reference let us define aLX and aLY as the unit labor requirements in the production of X 
and Y goods, respectively. The limits of production in this economy can be determined by 
the inequality  
(1)       aLXQX+aLYQY≤L, 
where  
(2)                      QX=LX/aLX , and 
(3)                           QY=LY/aLY ,
denote, respectively, the quantities of goods X and Y produced in the economy; LX and LY 
describe the amount of labor employed in the sectors X and Y, correspondingly; L is the 
total labor supply.  
To determine what the economy will actually produce, one needs to know the 
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as pX(θ), where θ is a stochastic parameter that characterizes the state of the world, such 
that  
(4)          ,   XXpE =)]([ θ p
where       is the expected price of the commodity X. Thus, the supply of good X in the 
competitive economy is determined by the attempts of firms to maximize their expected 
utilities from profits. All firms are assumed to be managed by risk-averse managers40 
and, therefore, their attitudes towards risk can be characterized in a von Neumann-
Morgenstern fashion in the form of a utility function (Sandmo 1971; Leland 1972). Risk 
aversion implies that utility function U of profit π is strictly concave: U’(π)>0 and 
U’’(π)<0. Thus, each firm operating in industry X selects the quantity of output qx to 
maximize the expected utility from profit 
Xp
(5)                                     )]}([{ xq qUEMaxx
π . 
The first order condition (FOC) in a perfectly competitive environment can be 
represented as 
(6)  0 ,]})()[({ ' =− LXXX wap U E θπ
where  
(7)      xLXXX qwap ])([ −= θπ ,  
and qX denotes output of a single firm and w stands for wage in the economy. 
 The second order condition (SOC) is 
(8)                               .  0]))()(([ 2'' <−= LXXX wapUED θπ
Rearranging FOC we get  










 Expression (9) allows us to prove the following important proposition: 
 
Proposition 1.  Under uncertainty, perfectly competitive firms equate marginal cost to a 
certain value bigger than the price under certainty ( Xp ), i.e., 










                                                          
40 See Mayer (1978) and Batra (1974). 
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Proof: 
Let )(' XU π be the marginal utility of profit for θθ = , such that 0)( =− XX pp θ . 
Since the marginal utility is decreasing and all profits are non-negatively correlated, we 
must have that )()( '' XX UU ππ ≤  for θ , such that 0)( ≥− XX pp θ . Multiplying both 
sides of the inequality above by XX pp −)(θ , we get  
(11)  ))()(())()(( '' XXXXXX ppUppU −≤− θπθπ .  
If 0)( ≤− XX pp θ , then )()(
''
XX UU ππ ≥ , and consequently the sign in the last 
inequality is unaffected. Taking expectation we have   
(12)                  0)])([()()])()(([ '' =−≤− XXXXXX ppEUppUE θπθπ ,  
and taking into account that          
(13)                      0)]([)]()(([)])()(([ ''' ≤−=− XXXXXXX pUEpUEppUE πθπθπ ,  
we get  
(14) XXXX pUEpUE ≥)]([)]()([
'' πθπ .   
                                                                          Q.E.D 
 
An important implication of Proposition 1 is that the total output of industry X under 
uncertainty is smaller than it would be under certainty.  
Perfect competition in industry Y (without uncertainty) implies that the price of 
the good Y, Yp , equals marginal cost:  
(15)                                     LYY apw /= . 
Since wage rates need to be equal across sectors, we have 
(16)                                     LYLXYXYXYX aappppEppE =≥= ][][ . 
It follows from the expression (16) that in industry X the expected relative price of goods 
X and Y under uncertainty will be higher than in the certainty case.  
The proposition below reveals a link between the magnitude of price fluctuations 
and the expected relative price of the goods X and Y. 41
                                                          
41 The analysis presented in this paper can be replicated in a more general and more complex setting with 
two sectors and two production factors (as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade), but the 
complexity of the model makes it hardly readable. As an example, a link between labor market flexibility, 
expected relative prices within the country, and country price competitiveness in international markets in 
the model with two sectors and two production factors is analysed in the appendix. 
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Proposition 2. An increase in the price variability of good X with uncertain demand 
decreases the amount of labor allocated to the production of commodity X 
and increases the expected relative price of goods X and Y. 
Proof.  
Consider the effect of a marginal increase in uncertainty on the demand for labor 
input. To present the notion of increased uncertainty, define an increased variability in 
the density function of the price of good X in terms of a “mean preserving spread,”42 i.e., 
define random variable pX* as  
 (17)                                           , ϖγ += XX pp
*
where pX* is a random price, ϖ and γ are shift parameters which initially equal zero and 
unity, respectively. The mean preserving spread type of the shift in the density function 
of pX* leaves mean E[pX*] unchanged, that is 
(18)                        0][][ * =+=+= ϖγϖγ ddppdEpdE XXX . 
Substituting pX* by pX in the FOC of sector X, we obtain  
(19)                               E[U′(πX)(γpX+ϖ-waLX)]=0,   
where  
(20)                                        xLXXX qwap ])[( −+= ϖγπ . 
Differentiating (20) with respect to γ and taking into account that Xpdd −=γϖ  we get 









where D is the SOC determined by expression (8).     
            The second term in expression (21) is negative and the first term is generally 
indeterminate.43 However, in the particular case when we assume that the initial situation 
is such that  XX pp =  and an increased uncertainty causes only a very small increase in 
risk, then a certain price can be replaced by the probability distribution with all outcomes 
                                                          
42 Defining a change in uncertainty in terms of a change in the probability distribution, while keeping its 
mean constant, is quite common in economic theory (see, for example, in  Sandmo (1971), Rothenberg and 
Smith (1971), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971).  
43At this level of formalization, making a clear statement on the marginal effect of uncertainty on output is 
unlikely. To deal with this difficulty, one can focus on a particular case when the marginal impact of 
uncertainty is identical to its overall impact, i.e., when increased uncertatinty leads to just a little more risky 
distribuition than the initial one (see Sandmo 1971). 
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concentrated in the neighborhood of Xp . And, if price is known to be equal to Xp , the 
marginal cost is also equal to Xp . So, we must have 
                                       LXX wap = , and 









(23)                           0]))(([1 2'' <−− XXXX ppUED
q π . 
Therefore, if the distribution of prices is concentrated around its mean value 0/ <γddqX , 
an increase in price volatility decreases the quantity of output produced and increases the 
expected price of good X.44 Taking into account that the price of good Y is deterministic, 
we conclude that an increase in the price variability of good X has two effects. First, since 
the quantity of output produced is proportional to the quantity of labor used, it decreases 
the amount of labor allocated to the production of commodity X. Second, it increases the 
expected relative price of goods X and Y.   
                                                       Q.E.D. 
 One implication of Proposition 2 is that higher labor market flexibility resulting in 
a smaller time lag between the moment at which decision-making concerning labor is 
made and the moment at which the price of an output becomes known decreases the price 
of the good with uncertain demand, and thus makes the country more competitive in the 
international market for this commodity. This important result can be formulated as the 
following corollary: 
 
Corollary 1.  An increase in labor market flexibility makes a country more competitive in 
international markets for commodities with uncertain demand.    
Proof.  
As it is mentioned in section 3, lower market flexibility implies a slower 
adjustment of labor input to market conditions, and thus increases the time period 
between the moment when the firm’s input/output decision needs to be made and the 
                                                          
44 This result is consistent with Sandmo (1971) among others. We need to mention that Batra and Ullah 
(1974) show that in any case an increase in uncertainty leads to a decline in the firm’s output if absolute 
risk aversion is decreasing. 
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moment when the output is supplied to the market and real output price is observed (see 
Figure 1). This in turn implies that if labor market flexibility decreases, the uncertainty 
about demand at the moment of decision making (and price variability) increases (and 
vice versa). Consequently, by Proposition 2, an increase in labor market flexibility 
decreases the expected relative prices of goods with uncertain demand with respect to 
ones with certain demand. In other words, higher labor market flexibility leads to the 
reduction of absolute prices of goods with uncertain demand, and, therefore, makes a 
country more competitive in international markets for the commodities with uncertain 
demand. 
          Q.E.D. 
 
The other important implication of Proposition 2 is that differences in labor market 
flexibility, determining a time lag between the time when a decision concerning labor is 
made and the time when prices for output became known, and thus price variability in the 
time of decision making, lead to different expected relative prices, and, consequently, 
may change patterns of trade or cause international exchange of goods. 
 
5. The impact of labor market flexibility on international trade patterns 
Consider a world of two countries, A and B, and assume that each of the two 
countries has only one scarce factor of production (labor), and can produce two goods, X 
and Y. Production technologies are described by unit labor requirements aLiJ , where 
J∈{A, B} and i∈{X,Y}. Assume that the unit price of commodity Y is deterministic and 
the unit price of commodity X is uncertain. Suppose also that the labor market in country 
A is more flexible than in country B, which implies that input/output decisions in sector X 
in country B have to be made earlier than in country A, and, consequently, that deviation 
of expected relative prices from relative prices in the deterministic case in country B is 
always greater than in country A. This may change the pattern of trade predicted by the 
classical Ricardian model in the way described by one of the propositions below. 
 
Proposition 3.  Two countries, identical with respect to production technology and labor 
productivity, can be involved in international trade: the country with a 
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more flexible labor market will tend to export goods with uncertain 
demand, while the country with a more rigid labor market will tend to 
export goods with deterministic demand. 
Proof. 
Lack of differences in production technology and labor productivity imply that  
(24)                        aLXA/aLYA=aLXB/aLYB,  
i.e., in the deterministic case no country has a comparative advantage, and therefore 
international exchange of goods is not observed. Proposition 2 implies that under 
uncertainty higher labor market flexibility in country A will result in smaller expected 
relative prices in country A than expected relative prices in country B, and, consequently, 
country A will tend to export good X (with uncertain demand) while country B will tend 
to export good Y (with deterministic demand). 
          Q.E.D. 
 
The Proposition 4 implies that a rational for international trade exists even if there 
is no comparative advantage in the sense of differences among countries in technology 
and labor efficiency. Under uncertainty, a difference in labor market flexibility is the only 
reason for comparative advantage and international exchange of goods. 
  
Proposition 4.  Under uncertainty, differences in labor market regulations may change 
trade patterns resulting from a comparative advantage in labor 
productivity and production technology.  
Proof.  
In the deterministic case, country B has a comparative advantage in producing X if 
(25)                    aLXA/aLYA>aLXB/aLYB . 
Consequently, country B has also lower relative prices of goods X and Y, and thus it 
exports good X in exchange for good Y. Proposition 2 implies that under uncertainty, 
expected relative prices in country A (with a more flexible labor market) may rise less 
than expected relative prices in country B (with a more rigid labor market), and, 
consequently, country A will tend to export good X while country B will tend to export 
good Y. So, in this case difference in labor market flexibility changes the trade pattern 
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predicted based on comparative advantage in labor productivity and production 
technology. 
Q.E.D. 
An important implication of Proposition 4 is that in the real world, where 
input/output decisions concerning production of most goods are made under uncertainty, 
trade patterns can differ from ones that follow from classical economic theory under 
certainty.    
 
6. Empirical evidence  
This section deals with empirical evidence where the following testable 
proposition is postulated: the share of export of the sectors with high variation of firm 
sales increases with labor market flexibility. The hypothesis reflects theoretical results 
formulated as Proposition 2, Corollary 1, and Proposition 3. In particular, a high degree 
of labor market flexibility allows firms facing demand uncertainty to more quickly adjust 
their production capacities to shifts in demand. The reallocation of labor across firms 
within a certain industry is reflected in the change of sales of firms and industry groups as 
well (see Proposition 2 and Corollary 1). Since in a country with a more flexible labor 
market the scale of firms’ adjustment is much higher (i.e., there are substantial labor and 
production shifts across industry groups), a country with a more flexible labor market 
tends to export more goods with variable demand (as indicated in Proposition 3). On the 
contrary, in a country with a more rigid labor market, labor and production shifts across 
industry groups are much smaller, and therefore, countries with a more rigid labor market 
tend to export goods with stable demand.   
In order to test the hypothesis formulated above, we analyse the impact of labor 
market regulations on export demand variability within the manufacturing sector. The 
equation specification is of the following panel regression form:  
(26)         ,21 ititit uLMFWVAR ++= αα  
where LMFit reflects the labor market flexibility index, uit is the error term, and the 
dependent variable denotes the weighted variances of firms’ sales (WVARit), the fraction 
of an industry’s exports with high variation of the firm’s sales. It is determined as the 
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weighted variation of a single firm’s sales, which are calculated across years, from the mean 
variation across all industries, whose export shares are taken as corresponding weights:  
 
(27)   
( )( )
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( )  , 1                              
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where I is a number of countries, T number of years, and J number of  industries; 
w is the weight or the share of an individual industry’s export (ex) in the total 
exports of all industries (EX); q denotes the average sale of a single firm.  
The hypothesis test is H0: α2=0, against H1: α2>0. That is, the fraction of an industry’s 
exports with high variation of firms’ sales increases with the degree of labor market 
flexibility (i.e., α2 is positive).  
By pooling all the available observations that cover data from 37 countries (I=37) 
including the values of exports, the number of establishments, the volume of sales across 
61 manufacturing products (J=61), and the labor market flexibility indexes for the period 
1995 to 2002 (T=8),45 the regression coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS), random effect (RE) and fixed effect (FE) models. The data for the export products 
and the number of establishments come from the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization’s (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics Database and national statistics offices 
databases at the three digit level of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
of revision 2. As the proxy of labor market flexibility, the employment law indexes, 
which are presented in Global Competitiveness Yearbook (GCY) by the International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD) are used. Table 2 demonstrates the 
statistical moments of the main variables included in model estimation.  
                                                          
45A comparable data set is not yet available for 2003 and 2004 for all products and countries included in the 
study.   
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model 
  Minimum  Maximum  Median  Mean  Std. dev.  Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
LMF 1.1922 8.3612 4.7119 4.8109 1.3337 0.1781 2.6536 
VWAR 0.0133 249.9037 6.6709 16.2196 25.5625 4.9215 39.5923 
Source: the author’s calculations 
 
In terms of statistical descriptors, which are presented in Table 2, the labor market 
flexibility indexes are characterized by better properties than those of the weighted 
variances. The labor market flexibility indexes, for example, range from a minimum of 
1.1922 to a maximum of 8.3612 with a mean value of 4.8109 and a standard deviation of 
1.3337, indicating that the presence of extreme outliers is not likely in the data. The 
dependent variable, however, lies in a range from a minimum 0.0133 to a maximum 
249.9037 with a mean of 16.2196 and a standard deviation 25.5625. Hence, in terms of 
the third and fourth moments, labor market flexibility indexes are better distributed than 
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Figure 2. The shapes of distribution: a) LMF; b) WVAR 
 
It follows from Figure 2 that the shape of the distribution plotted on the labor market 
flexibility indexes is closer to that of normal distribution, while the distribution of the 
weighted variations of firms’ sales is very leptokurtic with most of the data concentrated 
within a more narrow range.46 High kurtosis reflects few large values of the weighted 
variation of firms’ sales (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Weighted variances in panel data  
                                                          
 
46Normal distributions are characterized by the kurtosis equal to 3 (see Green 2001). 
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The comparison of weighted variances across countries identifies Hungary, where the 
variance increased from 60 to 260 in 2001, as an outlier in the sample data and, thus, it is 
excluded from the data set. The results of an econometric estimation are demonstrated in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 2. The estimation parameters of OLS (the panel for I=36 countries and T=8 years) 
 
Dependent variable 









 -10.2650      
(4.1128)* 
   - 10.2650 
     (3.9729)* 




The LMF index α2
 4.9806 
 (0.8293)* 
      4.9806 
     (0.8850)* 
3.3518   
(0.7489)* 
2.5479   
(0.5015)* 
R-squared   0.1252       0.1252 0.0949 0.0851 
Prob. (F-statistic) of zero 
slope   0.0000       0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
95% confidence interval of 
α2
  [3.35,  6.61] [3.24, 6.72] [1.88, 4.83]  [1.56, 3.53] 
Hausman specification test: FE versus RE 
χ2 (1) = [(α2,FE-α2,RE)'[(V_α2,FE -V_α2,RE)^(-1)](α2,FE-α2,RE)= 1.46 
χ2 (1)critical = 3.84 
χ2 <χ2critical  
IThe estimated asymptotic standard errors (SE) are shown in the brackets below the estimated coefficients: 
(*) indicates a 1%  significance level. 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, the results of pooled OLS reveal the presence of a positive first-
order serial correlation in residuals as presented in Table 3 (the Durbin-Watson statistics 
is 0.07).47 The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, which is tested by computing White 
statistics by regressing the squared least squares residuals on a constant, LMF, and LMF2 
(NRT2=8.32∼χ2) is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity.48 
These findings suggest that standard errors and estimated coefficients are not valid to 
make an inference.  Since the residuals are not independent, the RE model is applied, but 
first, the model with robust estimation is performed and regression models with robust 
standard errors are applied. The robust 95% confidence interval is wider than both the 
                                                          
47 The null hypothesis of no AR(1) serial correlation in OLS residuals is rejected at the 5% level. 
48 The 5% critical value from the table for the chi-squared statistics with 2 degrees of freedom is 5.99.  
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previously estimated OLS and RE regression results by 0.22 and 0.53, correspondingly. 
In order to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator, we estimate the FE-model and 
perform a Hausman specification test.49 As reported in Table 3, the reported χ2 value is 
smaller than the critical value, so that the H0 cannot be rejected at the 5% significance 
level. This suggests that the RE-model is the preferred option for making an inference.   
Based on the results obtained by the RE-model, one can infer that an 1 point 
higher degree of labor market flexibility corresponds to a 3.35 point larger variation of 
firm sales weighted by export industry export shares. The estimated R2 explains about 
9.94% of the variation. The empirical evidence confirms the presence of a significant 
positive relationship between labor market flexibility and the export shares of sectors 
with high variation of firms’ sales. This can imply that firms respond to demand 
fluctuations by reallocating inputs to the production of goods with higher world demand 
which causes an increase in the variation of sales across firms as well as industry groups. 
As a result, a country with more flexible labor market is more competitive in goods with 
flexible demand and exports more goods with higher variation of sales due to the fact that 
the scale of firms’ adjustment is much higher and there are substantial labor and 
production shifts across industry groups. On the contrary, in a country with a more rigid 
labor market, the variation of exports across industry groups is smaller due to lower 
adjustment speed. Therefore, countries with a more rigid labor market tend to export 
goods with more stable demand.   
 
7. Conclusion  
The analysis above explored the links between labor market regulations and 
prices of commodities with uncertain demand, relative prices within the country and 
patterns of trade. It has been shown that since flexible labor market regulations allow 
companies to adapt to changes in demand quickly, firms’ decisions regarding labor input 
may be made based on better predictions (i.e., under smaller uncertainty), which  
improves economic efficiency leading to better allocation of resources. This in turn leads 
to lower prices of the commodities with uncertain demand within countries and makes 
                                                          
49The hypothesis test is that the individual country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other 
repressors in the model. 
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them more competitive on international markets for these products. Since in the real 
world, suppliers of most commodities and services face uncertain demand, a high degree 
of labor market flexibility may significantly increase competitiveness of all countries 
including those with high wage levels. On the contrary, rigid labor market regulations 
may increase prices for most goods and services within countries and thus decrease 
competitiveness of these countries, even those with relatively low wages.   
These theoretical results have been confronted with empirical evidence and a 
positive correlation between labor market flexibility and export variation across product 
groups has been confirmed. This implies that in response to world demand shifts, 
countries with flexible labor markets can reallocate labor across industry groups towards 
production of goods with higher demand. This causes an increase in the variation of sales 
across firms and industry groups as well. As a result, countries with more flexible labor 
markets export more goods with higher variation of sales due to the fact that the scale of 
firms’ adjustment is much higher.  On the contrary, in countries with more rigid labor 
markets, the variation of exports across industry groups is smaller due to lower 
adjustment speed, and the exports of goods with more stable demand is larger. The link 
between labor market flexibility and relative prices of goods in autarky explored in the 
paper reveals also that there would be a justification for international trade between 
identical countries even if markets are perfectly competitive. International exchange of 
goods with different price variability may stem from differences in labor market 
institutional settings. Simple analysis of possible trade patterns in a modified Ricardian 
setting shows that even if countries are similar in all respects (e.g., labor productivity or 
technology), but have differences in labor market regulations, then international trade 
among these countries can be observed, and a country with a flexible labor market will 
tend to export goods with variable demand, while a country with a rigid labor market will 
tend to export goods with stable demand.  
Since an increase in labor market flexibility has a positive impact on countries’ 
international competitiveness and thus on their balance of trade, a number of actions 
which may help liberalize labor markets can be recommended to both developed and 
developing counties. Generally, measures for increasing labor market flexibility require 
policy actions on several different levels. Firstly, removing the sources of labor market 
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rigidities through institutional arrangements and changes in labor legislation at the macro 
level is widely recommended. The policy actions at this level involve measures for 
reducing the power of unions, the role of collective bargaining, and the level of 
employment protection. From the perspective of labor market flexibility at the intra-
enterprise level, regulations can be accomplished through increasing wage and working 
hours flexibility, eliminating incentives for wage arrears, restructuring social assets, and 
using such active adjustment mechanisms as training and retraining policies. Such 
measures ease the movement of workers from one job to another and lower the cost of 
dismissals by inducing employers to fire workers with obsolete skills and hire new 
workers. It needs to be emphasized, however, that policy actions in a concrete country or 
region should be designed taking into account the specific environment, including 
macroeconomic conditions, the level of market development, value system, cultural 
heritage and many other factors.    
There are many ways in which this study can be extended and generalized. In 
particular, the problem considered in the paper can be presented in a broader framework 
using a standard two countries, two commodities and two production-factors model 
(Heckscher-Ohlin model). Such an analysis, although quite complicated (see Appendix), 
can lead to a number of interesting conclusions regarding, e.g., the impact of labor market 
regulations on relative prices of labor and capital intensive commodities with different 
demand uncertainty, predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and the Rybczynski 
theorem, as well as on the distribution of welfare within trading countries, and thus on 




Labor market flexibility and relative prices of goods in a two factors and two sectors 
model under uncertainty 
 
Consider a single economy with two perfectly competitive sectors, one of them 
producing a commodity X and the second one – a commodity Y. There are two factors of 
production: capital (K) and labor (L) available in fixed supply. Assume that production 
technology in the sectors X and Y can be characterized by Cobb-Douglass production 
functions fX and fY:  fX(KX,LX)= LXα KX1-α (0<α<1) and fY(KY,LY)= LYβ KY1-β (0<β<1), 
where LX, KX and LY, KY are the amounts of labor and capital employed in the industries X 
and Y, respectively. Following the analysis presented in Section 4, all firms are assumed 
to be managed by risk-averse managers and, therefore, their attitudes towards risk can be 
characterized in a von Neumann-Morgenstern fashion in the form of a utility function 
[risk aversion implies that utility function U of profit π is strictly concave: U’(π)>0 and 
U’’(π)<0]. Consumption patterns can be derived from the following utility functions 
U(QX, QY) = QXσ QY1-σ (0<σ<1), where QX, QY denote  the quantities of goods X and Y 
consumed, respectively; but in the analysis which follows we assume that the demand of 
commodity X is always uncertain, while the demand of commodity Y is known for sure at 
any moment of time. 
In order to simplify the analysis, following the considerations presented in Section 
3, assume that an error term in the prediction of price is a normally distributed random 
variable with zero mean and variance σt2 (this corresponds to the case when random 
deviations follow stochastic processes with normally distributed random terms such as, 
for example, the autoregressive process of any order).50 Since the distribution of the total 
random deviation from the mean value of price is normal, the total deviation can take a 
positive or a negative value, each having probability ½. Namely, the expected values of a 
                                                          
50 It should be stressed that although the assumption of the normal distribution of the random deviations 
from the expected price corresponds to the wide class of stochastic processes that would govern stochastic 
price movement, it is chosen solely for simplicity and clarity, and no attempt is made at generality. We 
believe, however, that many of the qualitative results would hold also in more general, and, consequently, 
more complicated models.  
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positive and a negative value equal π/σ 2t  and π/σ 2t− , correspondingly.
51 
Consequently, the price of commodity X at any time t (such that -∞<t<+∞) can be 
approximated as ,)(P tx σϑ+  where )( tσϑ  is a random factor (not known ex-ante) that 
equals θ(σt) with probability ½ and -θ(σt) with probability ½, respectively [θ(σt) 
= π/σ 2t ]. So, the price of commodity X is presented as )(P tx σθ−  with probability ½ 
and )(P tσθ+  with probability ½. In such a framework we can prove the following 
proposition:  
 
Proposition A1. An increase in labor market flexibility decreases the expected relative 
price of goods X with respect to good Y and makes the country more 
competitive in international markets for a commodity with uncertain 
demand.    
Proof.  
Perfect competition implies that the profits of all firms operating in industry Y 
(with certain demand) equal zero. The cost function of firms operating in industry Y is 
described as  
  waraYC LYKY +=)( .                                             (A.1) 
The terms r and w in the expression (A.1) denote the price of capital and labor, and aK,Y  
and aL,Y are the amounts of capital and labor needed to produce one unit of commodity Y, 
respectively. 





+ ,  s.t. . 11 =−ββ LYKY aa
The Lagrangian for this optimization problem can be represented as 
                                                          





































∫ ,  respectively ( t~η  prediction error equals).
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)1( 1 −−+= −ββξ LYKYLYKY aawaraL , 












.                                                            (A.2) 
In industry X (facing uncertain demand), the firms behave purely competitively, 
know their cost functions with certainty, and maximize expected utility from profit. The 
Cobb-Douglas production function implies that there is perfect substitution between 
production factors, so that firms can optimally adjust their input combination in response 
to changes in demand conditions. The crucial assumption is that labor is completely 
variable, whereas capital is quasi-fixed. In the consideration below this is taken into 
account by assuming that capital input is chosen ex-ante (i.e., before actual demand is 
observed),53 whereas demand for labor takes place ex-post (i.e., after choice of capital, 
however, if the labor market is not perfectly flexible also before an actual demand is 
observed). Therefore, the firm’s input decisions are distributed in time as presented in 
Figure A1 and, consequently, both decisions are taken under uncertainty of demand. 
Decisions regarding the amount of capital are made at time T1 [facing price fluctuations 
)(
1T
σγ ], while decisions regarding the amount of labor are made at time T2 [facing price 
fluctuations )(
2T
σλ ]. So, as T1≤T2, we have 21 TT σσ >  and )( 1Tσγ > )( 2Tσλ . In order to 
simplify notations in the analysis which follows, we will refer to price fluctuations in the 
moments of time T1 and T2 as to γ and λ, respectively. 
 
                   
   T1               T2        T3  time                
   
Decision about the amount of capital           Decision about the amount of labor             Real demand revealed 
 
Figure A.1. Timing of a firm’s input decisions in industry X 
 
                                                          
52 The Hessian of the Lagrangian is positive semi definite and thus the second order conditions to this 
optimization problem hold. 
53 Capital expenditures should be understood as irreversible investments costs required to purchase and tune 
machines, design and prepare specific moulds and tools. 
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Under uncertainty, the firms maximize expected utility from profit. To simplify 
















π       
where a> b>0  and ππ << 0Π .55
Thus, for any given amount of capital selected in time T1, firms set the amount of labor 
(in time T2) considering the following optimization problem (production function implies 
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KXX waP                                                                   (A.3) 
where aK,X  denotes the amount of capital needed to produce one unit of commodity X. 
In time T1, firms facing demand fluctuations γ (γ≥0) take the price of the 
commodity as given and set their output assuming that the amount of labor will be 
determined in time T2 (facing demand fluctuations λ, γ≥λ≥0). So, output is set as a 
function of labor, considering the following optimization problem (the production 





XxX lqk ): 
                                                          
54  See Cukrowski, Fischer and Aksen (2002).  



















































































LXX arP ,                                                                         (*) 
where  aL,X  denotes amount of labor needed to produce one unit of commodity X. 
















KXLX waar , and after 















KXLX waar . (A.4)                                           
Homogeneity of degree one of the production functions [fX(KX,LX)= LXα KX1-α, (0<α<1) 
and fY(KY,LY)= LYβ KY1-β (0<β<1)] implies that 
11 =−ββ KYLY aa                                                                              (A.5) 
and 
11 =−αα KXLX aa .                                                                                 (A.6) 
Full resource utilization implies that  
                                                                    (A.7) LaQaQ LXXLYY =+
and 
  KQXaaQ KXKYY =+  .                                                     (A.8) 
The relative demand function for goods X and Y can be derived (in the moment T3) from 





 ,    s. t. MQPQP XXYY ≤+ , 


























X 44 344 21
, the SOC holds. 
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where PY, PX denote, respectively, the prices of good Y and X, and M is consumer’s 
budget. The Lagrangian for this problem can be represented as 
)(1 MQPQPQQ XXYYXY −+−=

































Setting PY as a numeraire good with price equal to 1 (i.e., PY=1), relative demand 








1 .                                                                 (A.9) 
The autarky equilibrium in the economy can be characterized by the set of 
equations (A.1-A.9), which can be solved with respect to nine unknown variables: QY , 
QX, aK,Y, aK,X, aL,Y, aL,X, w, r, PX . 
Assuming for simplicity that 2/1=σ  ( 11 =−
σ
σ ) and βα −= 1 , the system of 
equations can be represented as follows: 
 
                                                          
58The Hessian of the Lagrangian is negative semi definite and thus the second order conditions to this 























































































  (A.10) 
Solving it with respect to Px and rearranging, we get 
 
                                             . (A.11) 
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In order to determine the pattern of changes in the expected relative price Px with 











































































































































































































































































































the pattern of changes can be determined (by an Envelope Theorem) based on the analysis 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































.                                         (A.13) 
 
The denominator in the expression above is always greater than zero and numerator is 














. Taking into account that 
φ is always negative, the expression above can be represented as 
))(12()2( φλαφλα +−>+ XX PP  and after rearrangement as 0)1( >−+ αφλXP . 






ddHddP λλ .                                                              (A.14) 
Since price fluctuations λ, which are observed at the moment of decision-making 
regarding labor input, is inversely related to the variation of labor market flexibility, an 
increase in the degree of labor market flexibility causes the expected relative price of 
good X (with respect to good Y) to fall. The underlying mechanism for this is the 
following: the higher the degree of labor market flexibility, the shorter is the time interval 
between moments T3 and T2, during which labor adjusts to changes in the market 
demand. Consequently, price fluctuations λ observed at time T2 are smaller as well. And, 
because the price of commodity Y does not change, an increase in labor market flexibility 
decreases the price of good X relative to Y and thus makes the country more competitive 
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The ideal measure of inflation should reflect long-run price movements driven by actual 
demand in the economy and exclude short-term supply shocks. Considering that the CPI 
does not correspond to such a measure, the purpose of this research is to analyze 
alternative methods of core (or underlying) inflation and to choose a method suitable for 
measuring core inflation in the Kyrgyz Republic. The results can be useful for proper 
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Inflation is one of the key issues of macroeconomic stability in transition 
countries, as it has a strong influence on many economic indicators such as the state 
budget, exchange rate, interest rate, wages, and level of poverty. Moreover, high inflation 
undermines the general trust in the political and economic system, impacting the inflow 
of direct investments. The success and efficiency of monetary policy in terms of inflation 
stability depends on whether an inflation measure reflects long-term price movements or 
includes short-term structural shocks as well. The common inflation measure in transition 
economies is the consumer price index (CPI). It is identified as the average weighted 
price level of a set of selected goods and services that are included in a consumer basket. 
Such an inflation measure is impacted by both monetary and non-monetary factors.  
The strong impact of non-monetary factors on an inflation measure can lead to  
significant volatility of price changes, raising the question of whether inflation is the 
result of a persistent, long-term trend or reflects only short-term shifts in prices. If an 
inflation measure contains short-term shifts, it can significantly complicate the task of 
controlling inflation for policymakers. Therefore, it is important to distinguish long-term 
price movements which are driven by actual demand in the economy and do not respond 
to various short-term shocks. Such an inflation measure, which is called core inflation, is 
defined as a sustained change in prices induced by monetary factors. The basic 
motivation for using core inflation thus is to ignore short-term price shifts of a temporary 
nature and to consider steady underlying economic fundamentals.  
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the methods of measuring core (or 
underlying) inflation and to determine a more suitable measure of core inflation that 
excludes exogenous factors from the general inflation signal in the Kyrgyz Republic 
(KR). This is because the inflation measure which is used by the central bank, the 
National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR), for managing inflation is based on the CPI. 
Since the CPI is a rather weak indicator for measuring the basic inflation trend due to its 
high volatility and seasonal patterns (Figure 1), the issue of measuring core inflation in 
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Figure 1. Inflation during July 1995 to April 2004: annualized monthly rates (Y/Y)  
 
 
The high volatility and irregular fluctuations in the CPI, as depicted in Figure 1, stem 
from the strong impact of non-monetary factors to which the NBKR basically does not 
react or is not capable of influencing. The key sources of such factors in the KR are the 
high share of agriculture in the economy, the change of state-controlled prices and tariffs, 
periodicity or delays in price records, exchange rate fluctuations, and a heavy dependence 
on energy prices and energy products (e.g., oil products, fuel, and natural gas).  
Undoubtedly, increases in prices caused by the specific factors mentioned above 
lead to an increase in the CPI. And, if the CPI increases beyond permissible limits, the 
NBKR will tighten its monetary policy. So, there is a question whether the action of the 
NBKR in a given situation is correct. Evidently, the presence of shocks, which are caused 
by short-term shocks and directly or indirectly included in the CPI, significantly 
complicates the main objective of the NBKR to control inflation. Besides, even if the 
central bank would not restrict its monetary policy, temporary shifts in the CPI caused by 
short-term shocks may reverberate through the economy for a much longer period. A 
measure that can smoothly approximate inflation would allow for more effective 
decision-making in the economy as a whole since short-term shifts in prices do not 
require a reaction from policymakers nor from other agents. Therefore, such shifts should 
be omitted from an inflation signal. 
The paper consists of six sections with the following structure. The theoretical 
background for measuring core inflation and four alternative methods (e.g., exclusion, 
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trimmed means, standard deviation trimmed means, and percentiles) are provided in 
Section 2. Section 3 presents information on the system of CPI measurement in the KR 
and the behavior of individual prices within the CPI and reveals that the CPI in the KR 
does not correspond to long-term price movements. The four alternative methods of 
measuring core inflation are analyzed and empirical results are reported in Section 4. 
Then, the derived inflation measures are compared in terms of a smoothness property by 
minimizing their distance from a smoothed CPI time series in Section 5. Section 6 
summarizes the main findings and concludes with general remarks.    
     
2. Conceptual framework 
The concept of core inflation is rather new in the literature; it was first formally 
defined by Eckstein (1981) at the beginning of the 1980s. According to Eckstein core 
inflation is “the rate that would occur on the economy’s long-term growth path, provided 
the path were free of shocks, and the state of demand were neutral in the sense that 
markets were in long-run equilibrium.”59 Eckstein linked the overall inflation measure in 
a Phillips curve equation to the following: the expected inflation measure, the gap 
between the actual and potential levels of economic activity, and the aggregate supply 
shocks. Then, he defined core inflation as the expected inflation. In the 1990s, the central 
banks of many countries60 adopted inflation targeting regimes (Haldane 1995; Neumann 
and von Hagen 2002). Since the primary objective of the central bank under this regime 
is to maintain inflation within targets, the problem of measuring core inflation became 
urgent. This stimulated further studies and contributed to the development of somewhat 
different concepts as well as measures of core inflation.  
Today, there is a wide range of literature worldwide concerning the issue of 
measuring core inflation. An example of work measuring core inflation in New Zealand 
is presented by Roger (1995, 1997). Research focused on measuring core inflation in the 
United States, Canada and Western Europe includes Arrazola and Hevia (2001), Blinder 
(1997), Bryan and Cecchetti (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996), Bryan, Cecchetti and Wiggins 
                                                          
59See Eckstein (1981).  
60Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom adopted an 
inflation targeting regime over the last decade. 
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(1997), Cecchetti (1995, 1996), Claus (1997), Clark (2001), Cutler (2001), Johnson 
(1999), Smith (2004a, 2004b), and Quah and Vahey (1995). At the end of the 1990s, 
work on core inflation appeared in transition countries as well (Charemza, Makarova and 
Parchomenko 2000; Wozniak 1999).  The methodology of measuring core inflation 
described in the cited literature can be divided into two main approaches: one is based on 
statistical methods and the other approach, the modeling approach, focuses on a 
conceptual problem - the problem of defining core inflation.  
A structural approach to modeling core inflation was originally described in the 
paper of Quah and Vahey (1995). The theoretical framework behind this approach is that 
in the long run, inflation reflects the state of demand in an economy and does not 
influence the real output. However, unexpected inflationary shocks could cause 
significant shifts in the economic structure and thus in real output in the short and middle 
terms. According to Quah and Vahey (1995), inflation measurement based on the CPI 
could be erroneous because of its high sensitivity to various non-monetary factors. In this 
respect, the authors suggest breaking the inflation measure into core and residual parts 
using a time series of aggregated CPI data.  Core inflation is the component of inflation 
that does not influence the real output in the long run and reflects the state of demand in 
an economy.  
An approach based on statistical methods was initially provided in the papers of 
Bryan and Cecchetti (1993, 1994), Bryan, Cecchetti and Wiggins (1997), Cecchetti 
(1996). Generally, this approach is applied to disaggregated CPI data using cross-section 
and time-series methodologies. The cross-section methodology deals with constructing 
core inflation on a period-by-period basis using information on the CPI across its 
components (Bryan and Cecchetti 1993, 1994; Bryan, Cecchetti and Wiggins 1997; 
Cecchetti 1996; Wozniak 1999). Bryan and Cecchetti defined core inflation as “the 
component of price changes which is expected to persist over the medium-run horizon of 
several years.”61 According to the time-series methodology, core inflation is measured 
based on the statistical properties of the time-series in the disaggregated CPI data 
(Blinder 1997; Cutler 2001; Smith 2004a, 2004b). This methodology is focused on 
measuring core inflation with high predictive power through three steps: (1) choosing 
                                                          
61See Bryan and Cecchetti (1993). 
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time-series that produce better forecasts from the components of CPI; (2) finding the 
optimal weights; and (3) re-weighting CPI components in a way that the chosen time-
series (in step 1) have larger weights.  
The statistical methods of analysis, which are applied to the cross-sectional 
variation of prices, distinguish two basic categories of problems: noise and bias. Noise 
refers to all temporary shocks which do not impact prices in the long run and fade away 
with time, however, such shocks have a strong influence on prices in the shorter 
frequencies (e.g., month and quarter). Bias is related to a change in weights if CPI is 
calculated based on permanent weights (if CPI is calculated on constant weights the 
weighting bias becomes insignificant) or to measurement errors. The measurement errors 
arise from the possibility of mistakes when recording the price of a good. In the literature 
(Bryan, Cecchetti and Wiggins 1997; Cecchetti 1996; Hanousek and Filer 2001a, 2001b; 
Roger 1995, 1997; Wozniak 1999), four alternative methods of defining core inflation are 
described: the exclusion method, the trimmed means method, the standard deviation 
trimmed means method, and the percentile method. A brief overview of each method is 
presented below.    
 
2.1. Exclusion method 
The exclusion method omits certain categories or whole groups of goods and 
services from CPI prices which are traditionally highly sensitive to supply shocks and are 
usually self-transient. Such categories are, for example, agricultural goods, electric 
power, natural gas, other kinds of fuel, and tobacco. The agricultural goods (e.g., grains, 
fresh fruits and vegetables) are the most highly volatile component due to their high 
sensitivity to seasonal factors and natural supply shocks, so the rational for excluding 
these components from the basket is pretty obvious. With regards to electric power and 
natural gas, the main reasons why economists decided to include them in that category 
were derived from the oil shocks of the 1970s (Clark 2001). Later when oil markets 
recovered from the shocks, it was recognized that even if oil prices are not as volatile as 
the prices of agricultural foods, they still could largely be influenced by supply shocks. 
The same reasoning is true for the state-controlled goods and services or price controls 
(i.e., regulated industries). Therefore, the exclusion of all these items should yield an 
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inflation measure that is close to the central tendency and reflect the state of demand in 
the economy (Roger 1995, Wozniak 1999). This method zeros out the weights of goods 
to be excluded from the basket when calculating the weighted-average level of prices.  
However, this method has serious disadvantages if seasonal factors are important 
as in an economy like the KR, for example, due to the high share of agriculture. Besides, 
expenses on foods, energy and rental fees, which should be excluded from the basket, 
might represent the largest portions of families’ budget, especially in low-income 
countries. Under these circumstances, the intuitive exclusion of too many components 
from the basket may result in excluding not only noise and bias, but also a signal, 
increasing the chance of losing important information. This would make the concept of 
core inflation too suspicious for the public. Therefore, one has to be very careful in 
choosing the number of goods from the basket for exclusion in order to avoid the 
possibility of losing important information.  
 
2.2. Trimmed means method 
The trimmed means method is the systematic exclusion of the largest jumps and 
falls in prices no matter what group of goods they belong to. By zeroing out the weights, 
the maximal spikes and minimal drops are excluded from a range of price fluctuations in 
a given period of time, and then the average weighted price of the rest is calculated. This 
method allows one to lower the undesirable properties of the sample mean (such as 
maximal dispersion, bias, abnormal distribution), and therefore, it has attracted much 
attention from the majority of central banks. According to Wozniak (1999), the intuition 
behind this method is that the sample mean gives a distorted estimation of true inflation 
due to extraneous price disturbances. Therefore, the approach argues for a symmetric 
exclusion or rejection of a given percentage of data with extreme jumps or falls 
(minimum and maximum) from the distribution of prices. If distribution is symmetric 
relative to average prices, the exclusion of extreme values does not change the sample 
mean. But, if distribution is asymmetric, exclusion changes the sample mean upward 
(positive asymmetry) or displaces it downwards (negative asymmetry). Positive 
asymmetry specifies that distribution is skewed towards positive values, and negative 
asymmetry specifies that distribution is skewed towards negative values. If the 
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distribution of prices were approximately normal, then the sample means from that 
distribution could be the best estimator of the true mean because it would be unbiased.  
The economic motivation of the trimmed means method is mainly related to the 
dynamics of relative prices, which temporarily affect the aggregate price level, causing 
upward or downward short-term shifts. There are various theoretical models attempting 
to explain the causal relationship between relative prices and the inflation level. 
According to these models, the shape of price distributions gives basic intuition on how 
individual price changes contribute to the general inflation level. In particular, there are 
models which show that large fluctuations in relative prices cause higher inflation (Ball 
and Mankiw 1994, 1995), and on the contrary, there are models showing that an increase 
in inflation causes a fluctuation of relative prices (Mussa 1977; Shleshinski and Weiss 
1977). The main link between individual price changes and the aggregate inflation level 
is the behavior of firms. Ball and Mankiw (1995) explained this link using a concept of 
menu costs which states that a firm’s response to inflation depends on whether its price 
adjustments are costly or not. If price adjustments are costly for a firm, it will not change 
its prices. However, if inflation is so high that by adjusting prices an enterprise can avoid 
certain losses, it will increase its prices as well.  
 
2.3. Standard deviation trimmed means method 
The standard deviation trimmed means method is based on the exclusion of all 
extraneous price jumps or falls if in a given month some prices increased or decreased 
too strongly compared to the same months of other years. The details are considered by 
Bryan, Cecchetti and Wiggins (1997), and Wozniak (1999). The basic idea of the method 
is to exclude all price jumps or falls in a given period that are more remote compared to 
the change of prices in the corresponding periods included in the whole sample. At the 
same time, it is possible to throw out price jumps asymmetrically. For example, if in any 
period there was strong inflation resulting from a sharp jump in certain prices (e.g., 
distribution is skewed towards positive values), then exclusion will eliminate variables 
only at the one end. Only large jumps are omitted, thus it is suggested to exclude the 
highest price jumps or falls on a period-by-period basis. The main drawback of the 
method, however, is the fact that prices are excluded without knowledge of the sources of 
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noise. Consequently, this method can discard pretty useful information in prices if 
outliers contain important news as, for example, the change of state controlled prices that 
play a very important role in forming price expectations for future periods.  
 
2.4. Percentiles method    
Lastly, the basic idea of the percentile method concerns achieving an unbiased 
estimator. Since the sample mean is the unbiased estimator of the true mean, the 
percentile of price distribution corresponding to the sample mean should also be an 
unbiased estimator of the mean of empirical distribution (Roger 1997; Wozniak 1999). 
For instance, the sample mean of the CPI corresponds to the 50th percentile at the 
symmetric distribution of prices. With positive asymmetry, when the distribution is 
skewed to the right, the percentile of underlying inflation is above 50. With negative 
asymmetry, when the distribution is skewed to the left, the percentile is below 50. In 
other words, the k-percentile of core inflation is defined as the k-percentile of the 
weighed distribution of price changes during a given time and the median CPI always 
corresponds to the 50th percentile. Clearly, the median CPI or the 50th percentile of the 
CPI will not always correspond to the mean of the CPI depending on the shape of the 
distribution. Therefore, the task of the method is to compare all price distributions within 
the CPI and find those percentiles which correspond to the sample mean.   
In comparison to other methods described above, this method takes into account 
all the available observations. The key of the analysis is based on the proposition that the 
distribution of price changes within the CPI in a certain period presents an individual 
sample in the whole population of price distributions. Such samples are interpreted as the 
set of underlying price changes. The most acceptable way of comparing the underlying 
price changes across different periods is to use the whole empirical sample of 
distributions. The fact that the method takes into account all the available observations is 
very attractive and useful for less advanced transition economies where the price setting 





2.5. Optimality criteria  
The accuracy of inflation measures derived on the basis of the four alternative 
methods is to be assessed in accordance with an optimality criterion. However, there is no 
one formal criterion by which the accuracy of core inflation measure can be assessed. 
Therefore it is reasonable to choose criteria based on their suitability to monetary 
purposes.  The literature considers the following important attributes or criteria desirable 
for core inflation (Wynne 1999). The suitability of core inflation as the indicator of 
current and future inflation is necessary. This implies that the ideal inflation measure is a 
smooth measure that closely approximates the general inflation trend. Timeliness and 
computability in real time is another important issue, so that history does not change 
much upon including new data. It should be transparent enough for the public and 
policymakers. This attribute suggests that the public might challenge a measure which 
excludes too many goods from the consumer basket as it can significantly deviate from 
the true cost of living index. In addition, the core measure should follow the same trend 
as the headline inflation, i.e., there should be a close relationship between measured and 
core inflation.  
Taking into account the above-mentioned attributes, the property of smoothness 
receives the main attention in this paper. The optimality criteria for choosing the efficient 
measure of core inflation are the comparisons of the root mean square error (further 
RMSE) and the mean absolute deviation (further MAD) relative to a benchmark trend. 
The 12th, 24th or 36th monthly moving average trends, which are initially proposed by 
Bryan and Cechetti (1995, 1996, and 1997), were adopted as the benchmark trend in 
many studies (see, for example, Wozniak 1999; Berkmen 1999; Clark 2001). However, 
since these criteria are arbitrary, alternative smoothing methods are experimented in this 
study and based on minimizing their standard deviations around the actual inflation rates, 
the benchmark trend is chosen. This issue is more carefully addressed in section 5.  
 
3. The CPI as a measure of inflation in the Kyrgyz Republic 
One of the key decisions the government of the KR took to eliminate 
hyperinflation at the beginning of the 1990s was to introduce a national currency (KGS) 
under a floating exchange rate regime. As a result, a typical two-tiered banking system, 
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including a central bank and commercial banks, was established. According to the law62 
on the NBKR, the main purpose of the central bank is to manage inflation that is 
measured by the CPI. The NBKR influences the money market through  traditional 
instruments of monetary policy.63 The exchange rate is freely determined on the basis of 
spot and other exchange rates on the foreign exchange market.64
The dynamic of inflation measured by the CPI and basic macroeconomic 
indicators during 1992-2004 is demonstrated in Table 1 (in the Appendix). The period of 
severe hyperinflation and deep structural imbalances is 1992-1994, when annual inflation 
reached the four-digit level as the immediate result of trade and price liberalization and 
the introduction of the value-added tax. During 1995-1997, inflation fell to the two-digit 
level and most macroeconomic indicators improved significantly. However, the financial 
crisis in Russia, which heavily hit the economy of KR in 1998, intensified a potential 
internal crisis and led again to high inflation. According to the NBKR,65 the effect of 
monetary policy measures taken to reduce inflation during 1998-1999 was displaced by 
the influence of external non-monetary factors beyond the control of the NBKR. As the 
crisis events faded, prices began to stabilize and the improvement of the external 
conditions regarding the KR contributed to a decrease in the inflation rate during 2000-
2004. 
 The official inflation data of the KR can be obtained from the National Statistics 
Committee of the KR (NSC KR) through publications and WebPages 
(http://nsc.bishkek.su). The price indexes published by the NSC KR include the producer 
price index, the agricultural price index, and the consumer price indexes. The CPI is 


























                                                          
62The policy-making board of the central bank is insulated from politicians and is given exclusive power in 
setting the instruments of monetary policy in order to maintain its primary goal, price stability.  
63Nowadays the most actively used instrument of monetary policy in the KR is open market operations. 
64Pursuant to the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic "On Operations in Foreign Exchange" as of 05.07.95, No 7-
1, Article, the activity of the NBKR on the foreign exchange market is limited to smoothing abrupt 
fluctuations in the exchange rate, while keeping international reserves at an adequate level, i.e., it allows 
speculative shocks. 
65See Annual Report of NBKR (1998). 
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The consumer basket of the average city dweller in the KR includes at present 343 goods 
and services (K=343), which are divided into three large groups - foods, non-foods and 
paid services. The weights of the index (qi
0, i=1,2, …,K) are determined on the basis of 
actual consumer expenses in the base period. The structure of these expenses is 
established by the state budget inspections over the whole population of the KR.  
 The NSC KR changed the structure of the consumer basket three times. The first 
change took place in 1995 when the Parliament of the KR altered the minimum level of 
the consumption budget. The next change was in 1998, when it included services in the 
consumer basket (education, public health and notary offices) as separate observations. 
And, in 2001, the number of components in the basket was increased from 305 to 343. As 
a result, during 1992-2003, the share of paid services increased from 11% to 15%, the 
share of non-foods decreased from 32% to 27%, and the share of foods stood at the level 
of 1992, which accounts for 58%. The sample of the CPI used in this paper, therefore, 
covers 305 categories of consumer goods for the period of July 1995 to December 2001 
and 343 categories for the period January 2002 to April 2004. The CPI is presented as the 
weighted average of individual CPIs of all components, i.e.,  
 






where wit is the weight of i’s component of the CPI in period t, and πit  is individual 
inflation of i’s component in period t. The wi,t in formula (2) is defined as   
 




















which means that wi,t is not a constant, but depends on the period chosen as the basis. 
There are several possibilities:  (1) previous month, (2) December of the previous year, 
and (3) the same month or period of the previous year. The constants are qi’s, which 
represent the structure of actual consumption expenses in the base period. Consequently, 
under the calculation of monthly CPI, the weights wi,t change every month because 
absolute and relative prices also change every month. The same phenomenon occurs 
when the quarterly inflation rates are calculated.  
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To see the rational for determining a core inflation or long-run inflation measure 
in the KR, it is necessary to obtain a picture of individual CPI distributions for all 
components; in statistical terms it is necessary to calculate the basic descriptive statistics 
of those distributions, i.e., mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis. The necessity to 
calculate descriptive statistics stems from the fact that they give basic intuition on how 
individual price changes contribute to the general inflation level. Since the monthly data 
for the KR contain a seasonal pattern that has a period of approximately 12 months, we 
apply one 12-month differencing between periods t  and t-12. This allows a decrease in 
variance caused by the seasonal pattern. Consequently, at monthly frequency the above-
mentioned statistical moments are calculated using annualized monthly (Y/Y) data.   
When plotting the distributions of individual price changes in the CPI, the weights 
of the consumption basket are used as the number (or frequency) of having equally 
weighted individual inflation components in the total CPI. In other words, the weights 
represent the probability of having a certain level of individual inflation rate in the total 
CPI. The skewness and kurtosis of monthly, quarterly and annual distributions of 
individual inflation rates are shown in Table 2 (in the Appendix).  According to the 
literature (Green  2001), normal distributions are characterized by the kurtosis equal to 3. 
However, in the case of the KR, both the mean and median of kurtosis at each frequency 
are much higher than 3, meaning that the sample distributions are not normal. Such price 
distributions (high kurtosis and excess positive skewness) are evidence of big price jumps 
which dominate the inflation process.  
To see a more accurate picture of price distributions on the basis of KR data, the 
dynamic of weighted and unweighted skewnesses is drawn on the basis of annualized 
monthly inflation rates. Figure 2 demonstrates that the peak of skewnesses is marked in 
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Figure 2. The descriptive statistics of price distributions in the period of moderate 
inflation (January 1995 to December 2000): a) skewness; b) kurtosis   
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In all subsequent years (except 2000), there is a clear tendency of the coefficient of 
skewness to decline; however, price distributions remain positively skewed. The shape of 
the price distributions, in particular high points presented in Figure 2, show the fact that 
large price adjustment processes in the economy of the KR took place in 1995, 1996 and 
2003.  
The government abandoned price controls on alcoholic drinks, tobacco, some 
items related to housing except electricity, gas and hot water supply, and notary services 
during these years. Besides, a number of important programs and projects, which were 
focused on achieving social progress by means of domestic resources,66 supporting the 
small business sector,67 and providing private enterprises in agricultural and tourism 
sectors with financial and technical assistance,68 were adopted as well in 1995-1996. 
Within such projects and programs over a thousand business plans were prepared and 
implemented in order to provide small business sectors with training, technical 
assistance, expert service and financial resources. Reform measures were also taken in 
the public and state sectors in order to lay off low qualified personnel and reduce 
inefficient state facilities and services.  
Consequently, price reforms, job creation in the real sector through opening new 
private small and medium-sized firms, and an increase in the demand of labor, especially, 
in reviving sectors such as agriculture, trade, catering, and services, stimulated large 
structural changes in the economy. The shapes of price distributions, which are shown in  
Figure 2, presumably indicate just how sensitive inflation is to such structural shifts in the 
economy, since the distribution of prices is asymmetric if the inflation level is sensitive 
either to positive or negative shocks in the economy. In general, the dynamics of prices 
within the CPI, in particular, strongly asymmetric price distributions, indicate the fact 
that the CPI is highly sensitive to factors that cause short-term shifts in prices. In other 
words, the influence of non-monetary factors on prices, as it is mentioned in Section 1, 
which are beyond the direct control of the NBKR, is high in the KR.  
                                                          
66See, for example, the long-run development strategy named the National Strategy for Sustainable Human 
Development (NSSHD). 
67See, for example, the Program of United Nation Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) focused 
on the technical assistance to small and medium size enterprise development.  
68See, for example, the Program of the Swiss agency Helvetas. 
 96
As it is shown, seasonal pattern and irregular fluctuations characterize the 
dynamic of the CPI, which contains 343 components. In this respect, the cross-section 
rather than the time-series methodology is applied in order to disregard temporary shifts 
in the general inflation signal. This is because of the large number of time-series to be 
forecasted, consequently, the large amounts of random variation under a relatively short 
time span in the CPI data would, generally, lower the forecasting performance of the 
time-series models (Franses and van Dijk 2005; Miler and Williams 2003). Therefore, 
this study focuses on the variation of components within the CPI and analyze four 
alternative methods (e.g., exclusion, trimmed means, standard deviation trimmed means, 
and percentile) of measuring core inflation. 
 
4. Model specification and estimation results 
Cecchetti (1996) provides a rather simple technique, connecting concepts 
mentioned in section 2 with the formulas in several steps. A change in the price of 
individual goods in the consumer basket (i) is defined by the expression  
 
(4)                , 
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where        is a trend change and a most suitable measure of core inflation, and        is 
relative inflation, which reflects a simultaneous burst caused by a change in the price of 
an individual component  in the consumer basket. The CPI is the weighted average of all 









Summing up the above mentioned expressions, we obtain  
 




where the second term represents the group of noises (nt) and bias (bt) tied to core  








where nt is a stationary noise with zero mean and bt is a bias that could be represented as 
bt = µb +ωt (µb and ωt are the bias of measurements and weights, respectively). 
If the inflation of an individual component i in k is determined as 
 













since the inflation of an individual component in the expression (8) is obtained from the 





















then the result will be the following specification of inflation:  
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At a rather large value of k (considering the assumption that stationary noise has zero 
mean), the bias resulted from the change of weights and stationary noise cancel each 
other out and the last component of the expression (10) turns to zero. The bias of µb 
measurements can be derived from existing data as a difference between the actual CPI 
time series and core inflation measure. The efficient measure of core inflation is defined 
by comparing inflation measures, which are derived using the above-mentioned four 
alternative methods, on the basis of their RMSE and MAD relative to the benchmark 
trend. Therefore, the question of choosing an adequate benchmark trend is crucial for 
deriving a core inflation measure. 
Previous studies focused in measuring core inflation (Berkmen 1999; Bryan and 
Cechetti 1995, 1996, and 1997; Wozniak 1999; Clark 2001) chose arbitrarily centered 
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moving averages (CMA) as the benchmark trend. The CMA based benchmark trend 
appears to be irrelevant for the data of the KR, since it does not closely approximate the 















Figure 3. Centered moving averages and the actual inflation rates  
 
 
As Figure 3 shows, there is a “slow” reaction of CMAs, which include 12 and 24 month 
periods, to actual CPI rates. In particular, the CMA trends either overstate in some 
periods or understate in other periods the time series of the CPI.  Therefore, other 
alternative smoothing and filtering methods are included in the study. These are the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering, logarithmic smoothing, powered smoothing, and the 
polynomial trends. To choose the appropriate benchmark trend from the set of simulated 
trends, the standard deviation of each series from the actual inflation rates are computed 
and compared. Then, based on minimizing these deviations, the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
with the smoothing parameter 10 (HP-10) is chosen as the benchmark trend. Figure 4 
demonstrates further that this trend closely approximates the dynamics of the actual 
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Figure 4. Benchmark trend: a Hodrick-Prescott filter  
 
The alternative inflation measures derived by our four methods are compared with the 
benchmark trends on the basis of MAD and RMSE, which are defined as follows:  
 
(11)                                                                 , and  
 
(12)                 , 
 
where yi is the distance between the derived inflation measure and the benchmark trend. 
Computed MAD and RMSE for all estimators are sorted in ascending order and better 
measures derived by each method are chosen. Below means obtained by the alternative 
four methods are examined in detail.   
 
4.1. Exclusion method 
The preliminary analysis of individual price changes in the KR for the period July 
1995 to April 2004 shows significant price fluctuations. The standard deviations of 
individual CPI prices across time, which are calculated on the basis of annualized 



















905.1. The standard deviation of CPI components across time throughout the whole 
period considered is shown in Figure 5(a). The five most volatile components are 
cologne, garlic, notary services, lipstick, and rent (per sq. m). After excluding these 
components from the basket some outlying items, which fluctuate greatly, still remained 
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Figure 5. The standard deviation of individual price changes: a) including 5 
highly volatile components; b) excluding 5 highly volatile components 
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These outlying items are at least twice as variable as the items lying at the median level 
of the standard deviations. Therefore, in order to exclude too volatile components from 
the basket, a cut-off point for exclusion is defined as the product of the median level of 
standard deviations for the annualized monthly inflation, which is 15.03, and 2.50. The 
components whose standard deviations exceed the cut-off point, which is 45.09, are 
excluded from the CPI.  
 The total number of goods and services excluded from the basket is 31, which are 
fruits and vegetables, rental fees, and imported goods (Table 3 in the appendix). The 
exclusion of these components from the basket significantly improves the inflation 
measure; its deviation from the benchmark trend measured by both RMSE and MAD is 
the lowest. However the suitability of this method to the conditions of the KR is 
questionable. The reason for this is that due to the high share of agriculture in the 
economy of the KR, policymakers pay great attention to the seasonal factors that cause 
price changes. Besides, expenses on foods, energy and rental fees, which are excluded 
from the basket, compose the largest portion of families’ budget. The size of weights, 
which are zeroed out systematically under the calculation of the average-weighted price 
of the rest of the components in the basket, is 0.1883, on average, for 1995 to 2003. In 
other words, about 20% of all information is thrown out every time when calculating core 
inflation. Under these circumstances, the intuitive exclusion of components from the 
basket might increase the chances of losing important information and make the concept 
of core inflation too suspicious for the public. 
 
4.2. Trimmed means method 
The trimmed means method is based on regular removal of the greatest jumps, 
allowing one to lower the undesirable properties of a sample mean. An intuitive 
explanation is as follows: the sample mean gives a distorted estimation of true inflation 
due to extraneous price disturbances. In the case of the KR the population distributions of 
CPI changes is not normal, not known, and vary over time, so finding a good estimator is 
problematic. In this regard, the author uses the fact that the sample mean is a function of 
the random variables: CPI1,…, CPI343. It is also considered that, theoretically, the 
distribution of the sample mean can be found through using two characteristics of 
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distributions: the mean and variance which do not depend on the density f(·). Therefore, 
the trimmed mean estimators, which are devised from means, can be examined and 
compared. To find the efficient trims, the CPI distributions are trimmed at monthly 
frequency using the annualized monthly data.   
According to the technique, which is in detail described and tested by Berkmen 
(1999), Nyman (1999), and Wozniak (1999), the components of the CPI are ordered in 
ascending order (CPI1, …, CPI343 according to the value of CPI) with their appropriate 
weights (w1,…,w343). Then, Wi is defined as a cumulative weight from j (the first 
component assigned for averaging) to i (the last component assigned for averaging) as Wi 
= Σwij in order to determine the set of observations for averaging, i.e., i  components such 
that 
 
(13)                       α/100 < Wi < (1- α /100) . 
 
Consequently, the obtained set of CPI components (i.e., Iα) used for calculating the 
weighted trimmed means is  
 
(14)               χα = (1/ (1- 2α / 100)) ∑i∈Iα wi* CPIi.  
 
The weighted trimmed means can represent two special cases: the sample mean, χ0; and 
the sample median, χ50.   
The procedure is performed with the 1% step of trimming, starting from 1% of the 
observations and ending with 49%, from both tails by the weights of the consumer 
basket. By sorting derived means according to RMSE and MAD, 6 better performing 
measures from the set of 49 trimmed means are chosen (Table 4 in the appendix). 
However, none of these measures, which are 1%, 2%, and 3% of trimming from both 
tails of distributions, can sufficiently smooth the inflation measure during the whole 
period of the sample. This is because the general inflation level is much more volatile 
during 1995-2000 compared to subsequent years. Therefore, the author decided to 
compare the RMSE and MAD of the derived means for the periods July 1995 to 
December 2000 and January 2001 to April 2004 separately. According to the results, one 
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can smooth the time series of CPI rates by omitting only 2% of observations during the 
first period, while excluding 26% of observations is necessary during the second period 
to minimize the distance of the derived measure from the benchmark. In general, in high 
inflation periods a smaller percentage of trimming is sufficient, and in the periods of 
moderate inflation, trimming with larger percentages is preferable.  
 
4.3. Standard deviation trimmed means method 
For measuring core inflation by this method, the extraneous jumps or falls of 
prices should be excluded from the distribution of individual price changes, leaving the 
remaining prices for averaging. The literature suggests that observations above and below 
1 to 3 standard deviations from the mean be discarded (see, for example, Wozniak 1999). 
The reason for this is that the normally distributed variables contain 68.2% of 
observations within 1 standard deviation from the mean, 95.4% of observations  within 2 
standard deviation from the mean, and 99.8% of observations within 3 standard deviation 
from the mean (Green 2001). Thus, it is suggested to exclude outlier price jumps or falls 
on a period-by-period basis.  
To find the cut of points for the CPI data of the KR, first, the standard deviations 
of individual price changes within the CPI are calculated on the period-by-period basis. 











-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80























Figure 6. CPI on the period-by-period basis: covering only the months of September 
during 1995-2003 
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It should be noted that the empirical distributions of individual price changes have a very 
wide range. The same is true for the standard deviations of price changes on the period-
by-period basis. Therefore, exclusion from the CPI is applied with varying standard 
deviations, depending on the range of their medians. Five alternative measures are 
calculated for the whole sample period and separately for the periods with highly volatile 
dynamic of inflation (January 1995 to December 2000) and less volatile dynamic of 
inflation (January 2001 to April 2004). These are the means obtained by excluding jumps 
and/or falls above and below 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3 standard deviations. For each resulting 
trimmed set of observations, i.e., for each standard deviation, the weighted-average level 
of prices are computed and compared against the benchmark trend.  
The comparison of obtained means with the benchmark trend on the basis of 
RMSE and MAD shows that the optimal threshold of trimming is above and below 3 
standard deviations for the period 1995-2000 and above and below 1.5 standard 
deviations for the period 2001-2004. In other words, during the periods of high price 
volatility, a smaller percentage of exclusion (i.e., below and above 3 standard deviation) 
improves the behavior of the inflation measure at which both the RMSE and MAD values 
around the benchmark trend are low. During more tranquil periods, however, exclusion 
with a more narrow range of cut-off points (+-1.5 standard deviation) is desirable (see 
Table 5 in the Appendix). We should remark that prices are excluded without knowledge 
of the sources of noises. Consequently, this method can discard useful information if 
outlier prices contain important news, for example, the change of state controlled prices 
that play a very important role in forming price expectations. This is the main drawback 
of the method. 
 
4.4. Percentile method 
The essence of the analysis is based on the assumption that the empirical 
distribution of price changes, which we observe each month (quarter, year), is the 
individual sample of the whole population of price changes. Consequently, we compare 
the set of changes in underlying prices. The most acceptable way to make such a 
comparison is to use the empirical sample of distributions. It is achieved by smoothing all 
possible normalized observations both by CPI components and time periods on each 
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frequency of observation (Roger 1997; Wozniak 1999). At the symmetric distribution of 
individual prices (median), the percentile of underlying inflation is equal to 50. Figure 7 
demonstrates the sample mean percentiles calculated over the entire sample period of KR 




























Figure 7. Sample mean percentiles: annualized monthly inflation rates, Y/Y 
 
The annualized monthly observation of the sample mean ranges from the 25th to 95th 
percentiles, meaning that as little as 25% or, at other times, as much as 95% of the CPI 
categories experience price changes that are smaller than the recorded CPI. The median 
level and the mean of sample mean percentiles, which are 65 and 63 percentiles, 
respectively, are quite close. Therefore, the range of prices for the comparison of 
percentile values with the benchmark trend is chosen according to both average and 
median levels of sample means. Table 6 (in the Appendix) presents six better performing 
measures chosen by RMSE and MAD from the set of percentiles within the range 50-80. 
The 55th percentiles have the lowest values of RMSE and MAD for the period 1995-
2000, when inflation is characterized by a highly volatile pattern, while in more stable 




5. Finding optimal measures  
As it was mentioned earlier, core inflation should satisfy the property of 
smoothness. To check this property, we compare derived inflation measures with the 
benchmark trend (e.g., HP-10) on the basis of RMSE and MAD. Table 7 (in the 
appendix) presents the better performing inflation estimators from the set of measures 
derived from each alternative method. As it is shown, eliminating extraneous price 
jumps/falls from the CPI that lie beyond +-3.0 standard deviations and excluding 31 
components from the basket allow one to significantly improve the inflation measure in 
terms of its smoothness. Two other measures, which are the 55th percentile means and 
trimmed means obtained by censoring 1% of observations from both tails of distributions, 
significantly lose in terms of efficiency. The comparison of alternative methods during 
the whole sample period shows, consequently, that means obtained by the exclusion 
method and the exclusion of unusual jumps yield better results compared to the trimmed 
means and percentile methods.  
However, as it was mentioned earlier, both the exclusion and standard deviation 
trimmed means methods have serious drawbacks, which might limit their practical 
advantageousness due to the conditions of the KR. First, expenses on goods and services, 
which are excluded from the basket by the exclusion method, compose the largest 
portions of families’ budget. Besides, the high share of agriculture in the economy of the 
KR does not allow excluding too many seasonal goods as policymakers pay great 
attention to the seasonal factors of the economy. A disadvantage associated with the 
standard deviation trimmed means method is the high probability of losing important 
information because prices are excluded from the CPI without knowledge of the source 
of price jumps or falls. If outlier prices contain information which is important in forming 
future price expectations, then excluding these prices is not desirable. In general, the 
intuitive exclusion of important components from the basket might increase the chances 
of losing necessary information. Thus, it can make both private and public opinion 
suspicious of the concept of core inflation as the long-run inflation measure.  
Figure 8 shows the dynamic of smoothed inflation measures chosen by RMSE 


















































Jul.95 Aug.96 Sep.97 Oct.98 Nov.99 Dec.00 Jan.02 Feb.03 Mar.04


























Jul.95 Jul.96 Jul.97 Jul.98 Jul.99 Jul.00 Jul.01 Jul.02 Jul.03
















































Inflation rates by CPI, % (Y/Y) HP-10 SDTM
 
Figure 8. Core inflation estimators: a) exclusion; b) percentiles; c) trimmed means; and 
d) standard deviation trimmed means 
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As Figure 8 demonstrates, means obtained by the standard deviation trimmed means 
method are the best; MAD and RMSE are the lowest. The second best result is obtained 
by the exclusion method, at which MAD and RMSE are lower compared to the trimmed 
means and percentile methods. Despite the fact that the percentile method has poor 
results, it has an important advantage compared to the other methods. Namely, it takes 
into account all the available observations. Therefore, one should not reject it completely, 
especially, when in some periods the dynamics of aggregate price levels have large leaps 
relative to other periods as in the case of the KR. 
As it is already mentioned, the CPI of the KR is characterized by large 
fluctuations from 1995 to 2000, while during 2001 to 2004 its pattern is much smoother. 
Taking this into account, RMSE and MAD of the derived means are compared separately 
for the periods July 1995 to December 2000 and January 2001 to April 2004. The 
analysis of the alternative methods in the environment of low inflation only shows that 
the 65th percentiles of the CPI are the most suitable measure of core inflation (see Table 7 
in the Appendix). The MAD and RMSE of these percentiles from the benchmark trend is 
the lowest among all alternatives estimated during 2001-2004. This indicates the fact that 
during periods of more stable inflation, the core inflation measure is more distanced from 
the median of the CPI. In more volatile periods, on the contrary, it is close to the median 
of the CPI. In other words, when the aggregate CPI has a steady downward trend after a 
large spike, the methods based on exclusion perform especially well. When the aggregate 
CPI is low and more diverse in its changing pattern, the percentiles and trimmed means 
methods are better for measuring core inflation.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The success and efficiency of monetary policy in terms of inflation stability 
depends on whether the inflation measure reflects long-term price movements or includes 
short-term shocks as well. This paper presents information on the system of inflation 
measurement in the KR and argues that the inflation measure based on the CPI does not 
correspond to the ideal inflation measure. High volatility of the CPI, which stems from its 
strong sensitivity to various non-monetary factors and structural (supply) shocks, 
significantly complicates the main goal of the central bank, to control inflation. In this 
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respect, this study investigates four alternative methods (e.g., exclusion, trimmed means, 
standard deviation trimmed means, and percentile) of measuring core inflation. 
The sample covers a full set of the disaggregated CPI data for the period of 1995-
2004. Inflation measures obtained on the basis of four alternative methods are examined 
based on the property of a long-term inflation measure – the smoothness property. This 
property is evaluated by minimizing the distance (RMSE and MAD) between derived 
inflation measures and the benchmark trend (HP-10) of the CPI. The results suggest that 
in periods of large declines in inflation (when all or almost all CPI components decrease 
steadily), the standard deviation trimmed means and exclusion means are preferable, 
while in periods of more diverse change across CPI items, the percentile means are 
robust. Since inflation was falling during most of the years included, the exclusion and 
the standard deviation trimmed means methods seem to yield better results for the whole 
period. However, these methods have a serious disadvantage because exclusion occurs at 
the intuitive level and the probability of losing important information is high. In this 
respect, four methods are compared in periods of low inflation only. It reveals that the 
percentile method, which takes into account all the available observations, is robust.    
In general, this research is the first attempt to study and test the alternative 
methods of measuring core inflation on the basis of KR data.  Therefore, the results of 
this research should not be considered a definitive answer to what is the appropriate 
measure of core inflation in the KR. Rather it sheds some light on the way of filtering out 
noises and short-term shifts in price changes in order to get a smoothed inflation measure. 
The results show that additional research is necessary. In particular, it is desirable to test 
alternative methods on the extended data with changing inflation trends. Also, a more 
convincing theoretical approach for separating actual time series that are highly sensitive 
to exogenous shocks into smooth and stationary components is necessary.   
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Appendix: Tables  
 








































-foods 2876 980 73 41 39 15 117 45 10 0 2 5
-non-foods 1063 940 73 13 20 6 11 30 7 1 1 2
-paid services 440 5790 509 38 42 18 23 36 16 22 4 18
GDP(%, rate) -16 -16 -20 -5 7 10 2 4 5 5 0 7
Budget deficit  





























































Source: NBKR, NSC, MF, WDI 
 
Table 2. Skewness and kurtosis of CPI distributions: 
    annualized monthly data 
  
 Weighted Unweighted 
 Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis 
Mean 7.3 200.3 6.2 78.0
Median 3.1 22.8 3.9 30.9
Standard deviation 9.7 370.9 5.1 91.7
Sources: NSC, calculations of the author 
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Table 3. Standard deviations (SD) of prices during July 1995 to April 2004  
  Weights 
  
 
SD 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
# Excluded items:  0.0489 0.0492 0.0455 0.0503 0.0533 0.0554 0.0585 0.0766 0.0766
1 Cologne 905 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0027 0.0027
2 Garlic 486 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 0.0005 0.0008 0.0011 0.0011
3 Notary services 481 0.0005 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0009
4 Lipstick 333 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0025 0.0025
5 Rent per sq.m 303 0.0017 0.0017 0.0019 0.0019 0.0026 0.0029 0.0021 0.0025 0.0025
6 Onion 107 0.0065 0.0062 0.0047 0.0066 0.0058 0.0059 0.0081 0.0050 0.0050
7 Pear 106 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
8 Grapes 97.6 0.0013 0.0010 0.0009 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
9 Shoes repair 94.6 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011
10 Spring onion 72.9 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
11 Postal service 69.5 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0024 0.0024
12 Slippers 68.7 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
13 Fresh cabbage 68.3 0.0022 0.0025 0.0020 0.0022 0.0021 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018
14 Cherry 67.9 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
15 Water 67.7 0.0074 0.0075 0.0083 0.0085 0.0081 0.0111 0.0135 0.0263 0.0263
16 Tumip 65.7 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014
17 Beetroot 65.6 0.0014 0.0017 0.0013 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013
18 Detergent 64.3 0.0040 0.0038 0.0040 0.0040 0.0064 0.0062 0.0061 0.0057 0.0057
19 Envelopes 55.0 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 0.0007
20 Nuts 53.2 0.0017 0.0015 0.0009 0.0016 0.0017 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012
21 Paint 52.7 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0018 0.0014 0.0014 0.0020 0.0020
22 Apple 50.7 0.0041 0.0035 0.0031 0.0036 0.0030 0.0029 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
23 Telegraph 50.3 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
24 Lemon 49.8 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011
25 Apricot 48.7 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0012 0.0010 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
26 Aubergine 47.9 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008
27 Carrot 47.8 0.0042 0.0052 0.0039 0.0041 0.0038 0.0041 0.0045 0.0040 0.0040
28 Pumpkin 47.5 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
29 Strawberry 46.3 0.0016 0.0011 0.0013 0.0016 0.0016 0.0012 0.0012 0.0015 0.0015
30 Cement 46.1 0.0012 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 0.0032 0.0038 0.0032 0.0044 0.0044
31 Theater  tickets 45.8 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008
Sources: NSC KR, NBKR 
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Table 4. Trimmed means after 2-side censoring of price distributions 
 














2 3.1 2 2.4 2 3.5 2 2.8 26 1.9 26 1.5
4 4.3 4 2.8 4 5.1 4 3.4 34 2.0 34 1.7
6 5.1 6 3.3 6 6.1 6 4.3 32 2.1 32 1.7
28 5.5 28 3.8 28 6.7 12 4.9 8 2.1 8 1.7
8 5.7 8 3.8 14 7.1 8 5.0 10 2.1 10 1.7
16 5.8 16 4.0 8 7.1 28 5.1 4 2.2 4 1.7
Sources: NSC KR, calculations of the author 
 
 
Table 5. Standard deviation trimmed means 
 














+-3.0 2.5 +-3.0 1.9 +-3.0 2.9 +-3.0 2.3 +-1.5 1.3 +-1.5 1.1
+-2.5 2.9 +-2.5 2.2 +-2.5 3.4 +-2.5 2.7 +-1.0 1.6 +-1.0 1.4
+-2.0 3.4 +-2.0 2.5 +-2.0 4.1 +-2.0 3.2 +-3.0 1.7 +-3.0 1.2
+-1.5 7.8 +-1.5 5.2 +-1.5 9.9 +-1.5 7.6 +-2.0 1.8 +-2.0 1.5
+-1.0 10.6 +-1.0 7.3 +-1.0 13.4 +-1.0 10.8 +-2.5 1.8 +-2.0 1.5
Sources: NSC KR, calculations of the author 
 
 
Table 6. Percentile means  
 














55 4.9 55 2.8 55 6.2 55 4.5 65 1.1 65 0.9
60 4.9 60 2.8 60 6.2 60 4.5 60 1.3 60 1.2
50 5.9 50 3.5 50 7.4 50 5.7 55 1.8 70 1.4
65 6.1 65 3.8 65 7.8 65 6.2 70 1.8 55 1.6
70 9.9 70 6.4 70 12.6 70 10.3 50 2.3 50 2.1
75 13.4 75 9.2 75 17.0 75 14.8 80 5.5 75 4.5
80 17.6 80 12.6 80 22.2 80 20.2 75 8.2 80 4.9
Sources: NSC KR, calculations of the author 
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Table 7. Inflation estimators and the property of smoothness  
 The whole sample 
period 
July 1995 to December 
2000 
January 2001 to April 2004












Exclusion   
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